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Abstract
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simul-
taneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor
state. Two basic objectives are the safety objective to stay forever in a given set of states, and its dual, the
reachability objective to reach a given set of states. First, we present a simple proof of the fact that in con-
current reachability games, for all ε > 0, memoryless ε-optimal strategies exist. A memoryless strategy
is independent of the history of plays, and an ε-optimal strategy achieves the objective with probability
within ε of the value of the game. In contrast to previous proofs of this fact, our proof is more elementary
and more combinatorial. Second, we present a strategy-improvement (a.k.a. policy-iteration) algorithm
for concurrent games with reachability objectives. We then present a strategy-improvement algorithm
for concurrent games with safety objectives. Our algorithms yield sequences of player-1 strategies which
ensure probabilities of winning that converge monotonically to the value of the game. Our result is sig-
nificant because the strategy-improvement algorithm for safety games provides, for the first time, a way
to approximate the value of a concurrent safety game from below. Previous methods could approximate
the values of these games only from one direction, and as no rates of convergence are known, they did
not provide a practical way to solve these games.
Keywords. Concurrent games; Reachability and safety objectives; Strategy improvement algorithms.
1 Introduction
We consider games played between two players on graphs. At every round of the game, each of the two
players selects a move; the moves of the players then determine the transition to the successor state. A play of
the game gives rise to a path in the graph. We consider the two basic objectives for the players: reachability
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†This paper is an improved version of the combined results that appeared in [3, 2]: this paper is a joint paper that combines the
results of [3, 2], and presents detailed proofs of all the results.
‡There is a serious and irreparable error in Theorem 4.3 of [2] regarding the convergence property of the improvement
algorithm for safety games. This is illustrated in Example 3. In the present version we prove all the required properties for a
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and safety. The reachability goal asks player 1 to reach a given set of target states or, if randomization
is needed to play the game, to maximize the probability of reaching the target set. The safety goal asks
player 2 to ensure that a given set of safe states is never left or, if randomization is required, to minimize
the probability of leaving the target set. The two objectives are dual, and the games are determined: the
supremum probability with which player 1 can reach the target set is equal to one minus the supremum
probability with which player 2 can confine the game to the complement of the target set [14].
These games on graphs can be divided into two classes: turn-based and concurrent. In turn-based
games, only one player has a choice of moves at each state; in concurrent games, at each state both players
choose a move, simultaneously and independently, from a set of available moves. For turn-based games, the
solution of games with reachability and safety objectives has long been known. If each move determines
a unique successor state, then the games are P-complete and can be solved in linear time in the size of
the game graph. If, more generally, each move determines a probability distribution on possible successor
states, then the problem of deciding whether a turn-based game can be won with probability greater than
a given threshold p ∈ [0, 1] is in NP ∩ co-NP [5], and the exact value of the game can be computed by a
strategy-improvement algorithm [6], which works well in practice. These results all depend on the fact that
in turn-based reachability and safety games, both players have optimal deterministic (i.e., no randomization
is required), memoryless strategies. These strategies are functions from states to moves, so they are finite in
number, and this guarantees the termination of the strategy-improvement algorithm.
The situation is very different for concurrent games. The player-1 value of the game is defined, as usual,
as the sup-inf value: the supremum, over all strategies of player 1, of the infimum, over all strategies of
player 2, of the probability of achieving the reachability or safety goal. In concurrent reachability games,
player 1 is guaranteed only the existence of ε-optimal strategies, which ensure that the value of the game
is achieved within a specified tolerance ε > 0 [14]. Moreover, while these strategies (which depend on ε)
are memoryless, in general they require randomization [14] (even in the special case in which the transition
function is deterministic). For player 2 (the safety player), optimal memoryless strategies exist [24], which
again require randomization (even when the transition function is deterministic). All of these strategies are
functions from states to probability distributions on moves. The question of deciding whether a concurrent
game can be won with probability greater than p is in PSPACE; this is shown by reduction to the theory of
the real-closed fields [13].
To summarize: while strategy-improvement algorithms are available for turn-based reachability and
safety games [6], so far no strategy-improvement algorithms or even approximation schemes were known
for concurrent games. If one wanted to compute the value of a concurrent game within a specified tolerance
ε > 0, one was reduced to using a binary search algorithm that approximates the value by iterating queries
in the theory of the real-closed fields. Value-iteration schemes were known for such games, but they can be
used to approximate the value from one direction only, for reachability goals from below, and for safety goals
from above [11]. The value-iteration schemes are not guaranteed to terminate. Worse, since no convergence
rates are known for these schemes, they provide no termination criteria for approximating a value within ε.
Our results for concurrent reachability games. Concurrent reachability games belong to the family of
stochastic games [26, 14], and they have been studied more specifically in [10, 9, 11]. Our contributions for
concurrent reachability games are two-fold. First, we present a simple and combinatorial proof of the exis-
tence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for concurrent games with reachability objectives, for all ε > 0.
Second, using the proof techniques we developed for proving existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies,
for ε > 0, we obtain a strategy-improvement (a.k.a. policy-iteration) algorithm for concurrent reachability
games. Unlike in the special case of turn-based games the algorithm need not terminate in finitely many
iterations.
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It has long been known that optimal strategies need not exist for concurrent reachability games, and for
all ε > 0, there exist ε-optimal strategies that are memoryless [14]. A proof of this fact can be obtained
by considering limit of discounted games. The proof considers discounted versions of reachability games,
where a play that reaches the target in k steps is assigned a value of αk, for some discount factor 0 < α ≤
1. It is possible to show that, for 0 < α < 1, memoryless optimal strategies exist. The result for the
undiscounted (α = 1) case followed from an analysis of the limit behavior of such optimal strategies for
α→ 1. The limit behavior is studied with the help of results from the field of real Puisieux series [23]. This
proof idea works not only for reachability games, but also for total-reward games with nonnegative rewards
(see [15, Chapter 5] for details). A more recent result [13] establishes the existence of memoryless ε-
optimal strategies for certain infinite-state (recursive) concurrent games, but again the proof relies on results
from analysis and properties of solutions of certain polynomial functions. Another proof of existence of
memoryless ε-optimal strategies for reachability objectives follows from the result of [14] and the proof uses
induction on the number of states of the game. We show the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies
for concurrent reachability games by more combinatorial and elementary means. Our proof relies only on
combinatorial techniques and on simple properties of Markov decision processes [1, 8]. As our proof is
more combinatorial, we believe that the proof techniques will find future applications in game theory.
Our proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0, is built upon a value-
iteration scheme that converges to the value of the game [11]. The value-iteration scheme computes a
sequence u0, u1, u2, . . . of valuations, where for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . each valuation ui associates with each state
s of the game a lower bound ui(s) on the value of the game, such that limi→∞ ui(s) converges to the value of
the game at s. The convergence is monotonic from below, but no rate of convergence was known. From each
valuation ui, we can extract a memoryless, randomized player-1 strategy, by considering the (randomized)
choice of moves for player 1 that achieves the maximal one-step expectation of ui. In general, a strategy πi
obtained in this fashion is not guaranteed to achieve the value ui. We show that πi is guaranteed to achieve
the value ui if it is proper, that is, if regardless of the strategy adopted by player 2, the play reaches with
probability 1 states that are either in the target, or that have no path leading to the target. Next, we show how
to extract from the sequence of valuations u0, u1, u2, . . . a sequence of memoryless randomized player-1
strategies π0, π1, π2, . . . that are guaranteed to be proper, and thus achieve the values u0, u1, u2, . . .. This
proves the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for all ε > 0. Our proof is completely different as
compared to the proof of [14]: the proof of [14] uses induction on the number of states, whereas our proof
is based on the notion of ranking function obtained from the value-iteration algorithm.
We then apply the techniques developed for the above proof to design a strategy-improvement algo-
rithm for concurrent reachability games. Strategy-improvement algorithms, also known as policy-iteration
algorithms in the context of Markov decision processes [20], compute a sequence of memoryless strategies
π′0, π
′
1, π
′
2, . . . such that, for all k ≥ 0, (i) the strategy π′k+1 is at all states no worse than π′k; (ii) if π′k+1 = π′k,
then πk is optimal; and (iii) for every ε > 0, we can find a k sufficiently large so that π′k is ε-optimal. Com-
puting a sequence of strategies π0, π1, π2, . . . on the basis the value-iteration scheme from above does not
yield a strategy-improvement algorithm, as condition (ii) may be violated: there is no guarantee that a step
in the value iteration leads to an improvement in the strategy. We will show that the key to obtain a strategy-
improvement algorithm consists in recomputing, at each iteration, the values of the player-1 strategy to be
improved, and in adopting a particular strategy-update rule, which ensures that all generated strategies are
proper. Unlike previous proofs of strategy-improvement algorithms for concurrent games [6, 15], which rely
on the analysis of discounted versions of the games, our analysis is again more combinatorial. Hoffman-
Karp [19] presented a strategy improvement algorithm for the special case of concurrent games with ergodic
property (i.e., from every state s any other state t can be guaranteed to reach with probability 1) (also see
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algorithm for discounted games in [25]). Observe that for concurrent reachability games, with the ergodic
assumption the value at all states is trivially 1, and thus the ergodic assumption gives us the trivial case. Our
results give a combinatorial strategy improvement algorithm for the whole class of concurrent reachability
games. The results of [13] presents a strategy improvement algorithm for recursive concurrent games with
termination criteria: the algorithm of [13] is more involved (depends on properties of certain polynomial
functions) and works for the more general class of recursive concurrent games. Differently from turn-based
games [6], for concurrent games we cannot guarantee the termination of the strategy-improvement algo-
rithm. However, for turn-based stochastic games we present a detailed analysis of termination criteria. Our
analysis is based on bounds on the precision of values for turn-based stochastic games. As a consequence
of our analysis, we obtain an improved upper bound for termination for turn-based stochastic games.
Our results for concurrent safety games. We present for the first time a strategy-improvement scheme that
approximates the value of a concurrent safety game from below. Together with the strategy improvement
algorithm for reachability games, or the value-iteration scheme, to approximate the value of such a game
from above, we obtain a termination criterion for computing the value of concurrent reachability and safety
games within any given tolerance ε > 0. This is the first termination criterion for an algorithm that approx-
imates the value of a concurrent game. Several difficulties had to be overcome in developing our scheme.
First, while the strategy-improvement algorithm that approximates reachability values from below is based
on locally improving a strategy on the basis of the valuation it yields, this approach does not suffice for
approximating safety values from below: we would obtain an increasing sequence of values, but they would
not necessarily converge to the value of the game (see Example 2). Rather, we introduce a novel, non-local
improvement step, which augments the standard valuation-based improvement step. Each non-local step
involves the solution of an appropriately constructed turn-based game. The turn-based game constructed is
polynomial in the state space of the original game, but exponential in the number of actions. It is an interest-
ing open question whether the turn-based game can be also made polynomial in the number of the actions.
Second, as value-iteration for safety objectives converges from above, while our sequences of strategies
yield values that converge from below, the proof of convergence for our algorithm cannot be derived from
a connection with value-iteration, as was the case for reachability objectives. We had to develop new proof
techniques both to show the monotonicity of the strategy values produced by our algorithm, and to show
their convergence to the value of the game.
Added value of our algorithms. The new strategy improvement algorithms we present in this paper has
two important contributions as compared to the classical value-iteration algorithms.
1. Termination for approximation. The value-iteration algorithm for reachability games converges from
below, and the value-iteration for safety games converges for above. Hence given desired precision
ε > 0 for approximation, there is no termination criteria to stop the value-iteration algorithm and
guarantee ε-approximation. The sequence of valuation of our strategy improvement algorithm for
concurrent safety games converges from below, and along with the value-iteration or strategy im-
provement algorithm for concurrent reachability games we obtain the first termination criteria for
ε-approximation of values in concurrent reachability and safety games. Using a result of [18] on the
bound on k-uniform memoryless ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, we also obtain a bound on the num-
ber of iterations of the strategy improvement algorithms that guarantee ε-approximation of the values.
Moreover a recent result of [17] provide a nearly tight double exponential upper and lower bound on
the number of iterations required for ε-approximation of the values.
2. Approximation of strategies. Our strategy improvement algorithms are also the first approach to ap-
proximate memoryless ε-optimal strategies in concurrent reachability and safety games. The witness
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strategy produced by the value-iteration algorithm for concurrent reachability games is not memory-
less; and for concurrent safety games since the value-iteration algorithm converges from above it does
not provide any witness strategies. Our strategy improvement algorithms for concurrent reachability
and safety games yield sequence of memoryless strategies that ensure for convergence to the value of
the game from below, and yield witness memoryless strategies to approximate the value of concurrent
reachability and safety games.
2 Definitions
Notation. For a countable set A, a probability distribution on A is a function δ : A → [0, 1] such that∑
a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A by D(A). Given a distribution δ ∈
D(A), we denote by Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the support set of δ.
Definition 1 (CONCURRENT GAMES). A (two-player) concurrent game structure G = 〈S,M,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉
consists of the following components:
• A finite state space S and a finite set M of moves or actions.
• Two move assignments Γ1,Γ2 : S → 2M \ ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γi associates with each state
s ∈ S a nonempty set Γi(s) ⊆M of moves available to player i at state s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ : S ×M ×M → D(S) that gives the probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t)
of a transition from s to t when player 1 chooses at state s move a1 and player 2 chooses move a2, for
all s, t ∈ S and a1 ∈ Γ1(s), a2 ∈ Γ2(s).
We denote by |δ| the size of transition function, i.e., |δ| = ∑s∈S,a∈Γ1(s),b∈Γ2(s),t∈S |δ(s, a, b)(t)|, where|δ(s, a, b)(t)| is the number of bits required to specify the transition probability δ(s, a, b)(t). We denote
by |G| the size of the game graph, and |G| = |δ| + |S|. At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move
a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and simultaneously and independently player 2 chooses a move a2 ∈ Γ2(s). The game then
proceeds to the successor state t with probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t), for all t ∈ S. A state s is an absorbing
state if for all a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have δ(s, a1, a2)(s) = 1. In other words, at an absorbing
state s for all choices of moves of the two players, the successor state is always s.
Definition 2 (TURN-BASED STOCHASTIC GAMES). A turn-based stochastic game graph (21/2-player
game graph) G = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SR), δ〉 consists of a finite directed graph (S,E), a partition (S1, S2,
SR) of the finite set S of states, and a probabilistic transition function δ: SR → D(S), where D(S) denotes
the set of probability distributions over the state space S. The states in S1 are the player-1 states, where
player 1 decides the successor state; the states in S2 are the player-2 states, where player 2 decides the
successor state; and the states in SR are the random or probabilistic states, where the successor state is
chosen according to the probabilistic transition function δ. We assume that for s ∈ SR and t ∈ S, we have
(s, t) ∈ E iff δ(s)(t) > 0, and we often write δ(s, t) for δ(s)(t). For technical convenience we assume that
every state in the graph (S,E) has at least one outgoing edge. For a state s ∈ S, we write E(s) to denote
the set {t ∈ S | (s, t) ∈ E} of possible successors. We denote by |δ| the size of the transition function, i.e.,
|δ| =∑s∈SR,t∈S |δ(s)(t)|, where |δ(s)(t)| is the number of bits required to specify the transition probability
δ(s)(t). We denote by |G| the size of the game graph, and |G| = |δ|+ |S|+ |E|.
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Plays. A play ω of G is an infinite sequence ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 of states in S such that for all k ≥ 0, there
are moves ak1 ∈ Γ1(sk) and ak2 ∈ Γ2(sk) with δ(sk, ak1 , ak2)(sk+1) > 0. We denote by Ω the set of all plays,
and by Ωs the set of all plays ω = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 such that s0 = s, that is, the set of plays starting from
state s.
Selectors and strategies. A selector ξ for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function ξ : S → D(M) such that for all
states s ∈ S and moves a ∈ M , if ξ(s)(a) > 0, then a ∈ Γi(s). A selector ξ for player i at a state s is a
distribution over moves such that if ξ(s)(a) > 0, then a ∈ Γi(s). We denote by Λi the set of all selectors
for player i ∈ {1, 2}, and similarly, we denote by Λi(s) the set of all selectors for player i at a state s. The
selector ξ is pure if for every state s ∈ S, there is a move a ∈ M such that ξ(s)(a) = 1. A strategy for
player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function π : S+ → D(M) that associates with every finite, nonempty sequence of
states, representing the history of the play so far, a selector for player i; that is, for all w ∈ S∗ and s ∈ S,
we have Supp(π(w · s)) ⊆ Γi(s). The strategy π is pure if it always chooses a pure selector; that is, for all
w ∈ S+, there is a move a ∈M such that π(w)(a) = 1. A memoryless strategy is independent of the history
of the play and depends only on the current state. Memoryless strategies correspond to selectors; we write
ξ for the memoryless strategy consisting in playing forever the selector ξ. A strategy is pure memoryless
if it is both pure and memoryless. In a turn-based stochastic game, a strategy for player 1 is a function
π1 : S
∗ · S1 → D(S), such that for all w ∈ S∗ and for all s ∈ S1 we have Supp(π1(w · s)) ⊆ E(s).
Memoryless strategies and pure memoryless strategies are obtained as the restriction of strategies as in the
case of concurrent game graphs. The family of strategies for player 2 are defined analogously. We denote
by Π1 and Π2 the sets of all strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. We denote by ΠMi and ΠPMi
the sets of memoryless strategies and pure memoryless strategies for player i, respectively.
Destinations of moves and selectors. For all states s ∈ S and moves a1 ∈ Γ1(s) and a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we
indicate by Dest(s, a1, a2) = Supp(δ(s, a1, a2)) the set of possible successors of s when the moves a1 and
a2 are chosen. Given a state s, and selectors ξ1 and ξ2 for the two players, we denote by
Dest(s, ξ1, ξ2) =
⋃
a1∈Supp(ξ1(s)),
a2∈Supp(ξ2(s))
Dest(s, a1, a2)
the set of possible successors of s with respect to the selectors ξ1 and ξ2.
Once a starting state s and strategies π1 and π2 for the two players are fixed, the game is reduced to an
ordinary stochastic process. Hence, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined, where an event A ⊆ Ωs
is a measurable set of plays. For an event A ⊆ Ωs, we denote by Prπ1,π2s (A) the probability that a play
belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players follows the strategies π1 and π2. Similarly, for
a measurable function f : Ωs → IR, we denote by Eπ1,π2s (f) the expected value of f when the game starts
from s and the players follow the strategies π1 and π2. For i ≥ 0, we denote by Θi : Ω → S the random
variable denoting the i-th state along a play.
Valuations. A valuation is a mapping v : S → [0, 1] associating a real number v(s) ∈ [0, 1] with each state
s. Given two valuations v,w : S → IR, we write v ≤ w when v(s) ≤ w(s) for all states s ∈ S. For an event
A, we denote by Prπ1,π2(A) the valuation S → [0, 1] defined for all states s ∈ S by (Prπ1,π2(A))(s) =
Prπ1,π2s (A). Similarly, for a measurable function f : Ωs → [0, 1], we denote by Eπ1,π2(f) the valuation
S → [0, 1] defined for all s ∈ S by (Eπ1,π2(f))(s) = Eπ1,π2s (f).
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The Pre operator. Given a valuation v, and two selectors ξ1 ∈ Λ1 and ξ2 ∈ Λ2, we define the valuations
Preξ1,ξ2(v), Pre1:ξ1(v), and Pre1(v) as follows, for all states s ∈ S:
Preξ1,ξ2(v)(s) =
∑
a,b∈M
∑
t∈S
v(t) · δ(s, a, b)(t) · ξ1(s)(a) · ξ2(s)(b)
Pre1:ξ1(v)(s) = inf
ξ2∈Λ2
Preξ1,ξ2(v)(s)
Pre1(v)(s) = sup
ξ1∈Λ1
inf
ξ2∈Λ2
Preξ1,ξ2(v)(s)
Intuitively, Pre1(v)(s) is the greatest expectation of v that player 1 can guarantee at a successor state of s.
Also note that given a valuation v, the computation of Pre1(v) reduces to the solution of a zero-sum one-shot
matrix game, and can be solved by linear programming. Similarly, Pre1:ξ1(v)(s) is the greatest expectation
of v that player 1 can guarantee at a successor state of s by playing the selector ξ1. Note that all of these
operators on valuations are monotonic: for two valuations v,w, if v ≤ w, then for all selectors ξ1 ∈ Λ1 and
ξ2 ∈ Λ2, we have Preξ1,ξ2(v) ≤ Preξ1,ξ2(w), Pre1:ξ1(v) ≤ Pre1:ξ1(w), and Pre1(v) ≤ Pre1(w).
Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set F ⊆ S of safe states, the objective of a safety game consists
in never leaving F . Therefore, we define the set of winning plays as the set Safe(F ) = {〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 ∈
Ω | sk ∈ F for all k ≥ 0}. Given a subset T ⊆ S of target states, the objective of a reachability game
consists in reaching T . Correspondingly, the set winning plays is Reach(T ) = {〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 ∈ Ω | sk ∈
T for some k ≥ 0} of plays that visit T . For all F ⊆ S and T ⊆ S, the sets Safe(F ) and Reach(T ) is
measurable. An objective in general is a measurable set, and in this paper we consider only reachability and
safety objectives. For an objective Φ, the probability of satisfying Φ from a state s ∈ S under strategies
π1 and π2 for players 1 and 2, respectively, is Prπ1,π2s (Φ). We define the value for player 1 of game with
objective Φ from the state s ∈ S as
〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s) = sup
π1∈Π1
inf
π2∈Π2
Prπ1,π2s (Φ);
i.e., the value is the maximal probability with which player 1 can guarantee the satisfaction of Φ against all
player 2 strategies. Given a player-1 strategy π1, we use the notation
〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Φ)(s) = inf
π2∈Π2
Prπ1,π2s (Φ).
A strategy π1 for player 1 is optimal for an objective Φ if for all states s ∈ S, we have
〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Φ)(s) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s).
For ε > 0, a strategy π1 for player 1 is ε-optimal if for all states s ∈ S, we have
〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Φ)(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Φ)(s)− ε.
The notion of values and optimal strategies for player 2 are defined analogously. Reachability and safety
objectives are dual, i.e., we have Reach(T ) = Ω \ Safe(S \ T ). The quantitative determinacy result of [14]
ensures that for all states s ∈ S, we have
〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) + 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(S \ F ))(s) = 1.
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3 Markov Decision Processes
To develop our arguments, we need some facts about one-player versions of concurrent stochastic games,
known as Markov decision processes (MDPs) [12, 1]. For i ∈ {1, 2}, a player-i MDP (for short, i-MDP) is
a concurrent game where, for all states s ∈ S, we have |Γ3−i(s)| = 1. Given a concurrent game G, if we
fix a memoryless strategy corresponding to selector ξ1 for player 1, the game is equivalent to a 2-MDP Gξ1
with the transition function
δξ1(s, a2)(t) =
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
δ(s, a1, a2)(t) · ξ1(s)(a1),
for all s ∈ S and a2 ∈ Γ2(s). Similarly, if we fix selectors ξ1 and ξ2 for both players in a concurrent game
G, we obtain a Markov chain, which we denote by Gξ1,ξ2 .
End components. In an MDP, the sets of states that play an equivalent role to the closed recurrent classes
of Markov chains [21, Chapter 4] are called “end components” [7, 8].
Definition 3 (END COMPONENTS). An end component of an i-MDP G, for i ∈ {1, 2}, is a subset C ⊆ S
of the states such that there is a selector ξ for player i so that C is a closed recurrent class of the Markov
chain Gξ .
It is not difficult to see that an equivalent characterization of an end component C is the following. For each
state s ∈ C , there is a subset Mi(s) ⊆ Γi(s) of moves such that:
1. (closed) if a move in Mi(s) is chosen by player i at state s, then all successor states that are obtained
with nonzero probability lie in C; and
2. (recurrent) the graph (C,E), where E consists of the transitions that occur with nonzero probability
when moves in Mi(·) are chosen by player i, is strongly connected.
Given a play ω ∈ Ω, we denote by Inf(ω) the set of states that occurs infinitely often along ω. Given a set
F ⊆ 2S of subsets of states, we denote by Inf(F) the event {ω | Inf(ω) ∈ F}. The following theorem
states that in a 2-MDP, for every strategy of player 2, the set of states that are visited infinitely often is, with
probability 1, an end component. Corollary 1 follows easily from Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 ([8]). For a player-1 selector ξ1, let C be the set of end components of a 2-MDP Gξ1 . For all
player-2 strategies π2 and all states s ∈ S, we have Prξ1,π2s (Inf(C)) = 1.
Corollary 1 For a player-1 selector ξ1, let C be the set of end components of a 2-MDP Gξ1 , and let
Z =
⋃
C∈C C be the set of states of all end components. For all player-2 strategies π2 and all states s ∈ S,
we have Prξ1,π2s (Reach(Z)) = 1.
MDPs with reachability objectives. Given a 2-MDP with a reachability objective Reach(T ) for player 2,
where T ⊆ S, the values can be obtained as the solution of a linear program [15] (see Section 2.9 of [15]
where linear program solution is given for MDPs with limit-average objectives and reachability objective is
a special case of limit-average objectives). The linear program has a variable x(s) for all states s ∈ S, and
the objective function and the constraints are as follows:
min
∑
s∈S
x(s) subject to
8
x(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
x(t) · δ(s, a2)(t) for all s ∈ S and a2 ∈ Γ2(s)
x(s) = 1 for all s ∈ T
0 ≤ x(s) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S
The correctness of the above linear program to compute the values follows from [15] (see section 2.9 of [15],
and also see [7] for the correctness of the linear program).
4 Existence of Memoryless ε-Optimal Strategies for Concurrent Reachabil-
ity Games
In this section we present an elementary and combinatorial proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal
strategies for concurrent reachability games, for all ε > 0 (optimal strategies need not exist for concurrent
games with reachability objectives [14]).
4.1 From value iteration to selectors
Consider a reachability game with target T ⊆ S, i.e., objective for player 1 is Reach(T ). Let W2 = {s ∈
S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T ))(s) = 0} be the set of states from which player 1 cannot reach the target with positive
probability. From [9], we know that this set can be computed as W2 = limk→∞W k2 , where W 02 = S \ T ,
and for all k ≥ 0,
W k+12 = {s ∈ S \ T | ∃a2 ∈ Γ2(s) . ∀a1 ∈ Γ1(s) .Dest(s, a1, a2) ⊆W k2 } .
The limit is reached in at most |S| iterations. Note that player 2 has a strategy that confines the game to W2,
and that consequently all strategies are optimal for player 1, as they realize the value 0 of the game in W2.
Therefore, without loss of generality, in the remainder we assume that all states in W2 and T are absorbing.
Our first step towards proving the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for reachability games
consists in considering a value-iteration scheme for the computation of 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )). Let [T ] : S →
[0, 1] be the indicator function of T , defined by [T ](s) = 1 for s ∈ T , and [T ](s) = 0 for s 6∈ T . Let
u0 = [T ], and for all k ≥ 0, let
uk+1 = Pre1(uk). (1)
Note that the classical equation assigns uk+1 = [T ] ∨ Pre1(uk), where ∨ is interpreted as the maxi-
mum in pointwise fashion. Since we assume that all states in T are absorbing, the classical equation re-
duces to the simpler equation given by (1). From the monotonicity of Pre1 it follows that uk ≤ uk+1,
that is, Pre1(uk) ≥ uk, for all k ≥ 0. The result of [11] establishes by a combinatorial argu-
ment that 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )) = limk→∞ uk, where the limit is interpreted in pointwise fashion. For
all k ≥ 0, let the player-1 selector ζk be a value-optimal selector for uk, that is, a selector such that
Pre1(uk) = Pre1:ζk(uk). An ε-optimal strategy πk1 for player 1 can be constructed by applying the
sequence ζk, ζk−1, . . . , ζ1, ζ0, ζ0, ζ0, . . . of selectors, where the last selector, ζ0, is repeated forever. It is
possible to prove by induction on k that
inf
π2∈Π2
Prπ
k
1 ,π2(∃j ∈ [0..k].Θj ∈ T ) ≥ uk.
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Figure 1: An MDP with reachability objective.
As the strategies πk1 , for k ≥ 0, are not necessarily memoryless, this proof does not suffice for showing
the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies. On the other hand, the following example shows that the
memoryless strategy ζk does not necessarily guarantee the value uk.
Example 1 Consider the 1-MDP shown in Fig 1. At all states except s3, the set of available moves for
player 1 is a singleton set. At s3, the available moves for player 1 are a and b. The transitions at the various
states are shown in the figure. The objective of player 1 is to reach the state s0.
We consider the value-iteration procedure and denote by uk the valuation after k iterations. Writing a
valuation u as the list of values
(
u(s0), u(s1), . . . , u(s4)
)
, we have:
u0 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
u1 = Pre1(u0) = (1, 0, 1/2, 0, 0)
u2 = Pre1(u1) = (1, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 0)
u3 = Pre1(u2) = (1, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2)
u4 = Pre1(u3) = u3 = (1, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2)
The valuation u3 is thus a fixpoint.
Now consider the selector ξ1 for player 1 that chooses at state s3 the move a with probability 1. The
selector ξ1 is optimal with respect to the valuation u3. However, if player 1 follows the memoryless strategy
ξ1, then the play visits s3 and s4 alternately and reaches s0 with probability 0. Thus, ξ1 is an example of a
selector that is value-optimal, but not optimal.
On the other hand, consider any selector ξ′1 for player 1 that chooses move b at state s3 with positive
probability. Under the memoryless strategy ξ′1, the set {s0, s1} of states is reached with probability 1, and
s0 is reached with probability 1/2. Such a ξ′1 is thus an example of a selector that is both value-optimal and
optimal.
In the example, the problem is that the strategy ξ1 may cause player 1 to stay forever in S \ (T ∪ W2)
with positive probability. We call “proper” the strategies of player 1 that guarantee reaching T ∪W2 with
probability 1.
Definition 4 (PROPER STRATEGIES AND SELECTORS). A player-1 strategy π1 is proper if for all player-2
strategies π2, and for all states s ∈ S \ (T ∪ W2), we have Prπ1,π2s (Reach(T ∪W2)) = 1. A player-1
selector ξ1 is proper if the memoryless player-1 strategy ξ1 is proper.
We note that proper strategies are closely related to Condon’s notion of a halting game [5]: precisely, a game
is halting iff all player-1 strategies are proper. We can check whether a selector for player 1 is proper by
considering only the pure selectors for player 2.
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Lemma 1 Given a selector ξ1 for player 1, the memoryless player-1 strategy ξ1 is proper iff for every pure
selector ξ2 for player 2, and for all states s ∈ S, we have Prξ1,ξ2s (Reach(T ∪W2)) = 1.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Given a player-1 selector ξ1, consider the 2-MDP Gξ1 . If ξ1 is not
proper, then by Theorem 1, there must exist an end component C ⊆ S \ (T ∪W2) in Gξ1 . Then, from
C , player 2 can avoid reaching T ∪W2 by repeatedly applying a pure selector ξ2 that at every state s ∈ C
deterministically chooses a move a2 ∈ Γ2(s) such that Dest(s, ξ1, a2) ⊆ C . The existence of a suitable
ξ2(s) for all states s ∈ C follows from the definition of end component.
The following lemma shows that the selector that chooses all available moves uniformly at random is
proper. This fact will be used later to initialize our strategy-improvement algorithm.
Lemma 2 Let ξunif1 be the player-1 selector that at all states s ∈ S \ (T ∪W2) chooses all moves in Γ1(s)
uniformly at random. Then ξunif1 is proper.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that ξunif1 is not proper. From Theorem 1, in the 2-MDP Gξunif1
there
must be an end component C ⊆ S \ (T ∪W2). Then, when player 1 follows the strategy ξunif1 , player 2
can confine the game to C . By the definition of ξunif1 , player 2 can ensure that the game does not leave C
regardless of the moves chosen by player 1, and thus, for all strategies of player 1. This contradicts the fact
that W2 contains all states from which player 2 can ensure that T is not reached.
The following lemma shows that if the player-1 selector ζk computed by the value-iteration scheme (1)
is proper, then the player-1 strategy ζk guarantees the value uk, for all k ≥ 0.
Lemma 3 Let v be a valuation such that Pre1(v) ≥ v and v(s) = 0 for all states s ∈ W2. Let ξ1 be a
selector for player 1 such that Pre1:ξ1(v) = Pre1(v). If ξ1 is proper, then for all player-2 strategies π2, we
have Prξ1,π2(Reach(T )) ≥ v.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player-2 strategy π2, and for k ≥ 0, let
vk = E
ξ1,π2
(
v(Θk)
)
be the expected value of v after k steps under ξ1 and π2. By induction on k, we can prove vk ≥ v for all
k ≥ 0. In fact, v0 = v, and for k ≥ 0, we have
vk+1 ≥ Pre1:ξ1(vk) ≥ Pre1:ξ1(v) = Pre1(v) ≥ v.
For all k ≥ 0 and s ∈ S, we can write vk as
vk(s) = E
ξ1,π2
s
(
v(Θk) | Θk ∈ T
) · Prξ1,π2s (Θk ∈ T )
+ E
ξ1,π2
s
(
v(Θk) | Θk ∈ S \ (T ∪W2)
) · Prξ1,π2s (Θk ∈ S \ (T ∪W2))
+ E
ξ1,π2
s
(
v(Θk) | Θk ∈W2
) · Prξ1,π2s (Θk ∈W2).
Since v(s) ≤ 1 when s ∈ T , the first term on the right-hand side is at most Prξ1,π2s
(
Θk ∈ T
)
. For the second
term, we have limk→∞Prξ1,π2
(
Θk ∈ S\(T ∪W2)
)
= 0 by hypothesis, because Prξ1,π2(Reach(T ∪W2)) =
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1 and every state s ∈ (T ∪W2) is absorbing. Finally, the third term on the right hand side is 0, as v(s) = 0
for all states s ∈W2. Hence, taking the limit with k →∞, we obtain
Prξ1,π2
(
Reach(T )
)
= lim
k→∞
Prξ1,π2
(
Θk ∈ T
) ≥ lim
k→∞
vk ≥ v,
where the last inequality follows from vk ≥ v for all k ≥ 0. Note that vk = Prξ1,π2
(
Θk ∈ T
)
, and since T
is absorbing it follows that vk is non-deccreasing (monotonic) and is bounded by 1 (since it is a probability
measure). Hence the limit of vk is defined. The desired result follows.
4.2 From value iteration to optimal selectors
In this section we show how to obtain memoryless ε-optimal strategies from the value-iteration scheme, for
ε > 0. In the following section the existence such strategies would be established using a strategy-iteration
scheme. The strategy-iteration scheme has been used previously to establish existence of memoryless ε-
optimal strategies, for ε > 0 (for example see [13] and also results of Condon [5] for turn-based games).
However our proof which constructs the memoryless strategies based on value-iteration scheme is new.
Considering again the value-iteration scheme (1), since 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )) = limk→∞ uk, for every ε > 0
there is a k such that uk(s) ≥ uk−1(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T ))(s) − ε at all states s ∈ S. Lemma 3 indicates
that, in order to construct a memoryless ε-optimal strategy, we need to construct from uk−1 a player-1
selector ξ1 such that:
1. ξ1 is value-optimal for uk−1, that is, Pre1:ξ1(uk−1) = Pre1(uk−1) = uk; and
2. ξ1 is proper.
To ensure the construction of a value-optimal, proper selector, we need some definitions. For r > 0, the
value class
Ukr = {s ∈ S | uk(s) = r}
consists of the states with value r under the valuation uk. Similarly we define Uk⊲⊳r = {s ∈ S | uk(s) ⊲⊳ r},
for ⊲⊳∈ {<,≤,≥, >}. For a state s ∈ S, let ℓk(s) = min{j ≤ k | uj(s) = uk(s)} be the entry time of s in
Uk
uk(s)
, that is, the least iteration j in which the state s has the same value as in iteration k. For k ≥ 0, we
define the player-1 selector ηk as follows: if ℓk(s) > 0, then
ηk(s) = ηℓk(s)(s) = arg max
ξ1∈Λ1
inf
ξ2∈Λ2
Preξ1,ξ2(uℓk(s)−1);
otherwise, if ℓk(s) = 0, then ηk(s) = ηℓk(s)(s) = ξ
unif
1 (s) (this definition is arbitrary, and it does not affect
the remainder of the proof). In words, the selector ηk(s) is an optimal selector for s at the iteration ℓk(s). It
follows easily that uk = Pre1:ηk(uk−1), that is, ηk is also value-optimal for uk−1, satisfying the first of the
above conditions.
To conclude the construction, we need to prove that for k sufficiently large (namely, for k such that
uk(s) > 0 at all states s ∈ S \ (T ∪W2)), the selector ηk is proper. To this end we use Theorem 1, and
show that for sufficiently large k no end component of Gηk is entirely contained in S \(T ∪W2).1 To reason
about the end components of Gηk , for a state s ∈ S and a player-2 move a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we write
Destk(s, a2) =
⋃
a1∈Supp(ηk(s))
Dest(s, a1, a2)
1In fact, the result holds for all k, even though our proof, for the sake of a simpler argument, does not show it.
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for the set of possible successors of state s when player 1 follows the strategy ηk, and player 2 chooses the
move a2.
Lemma 4 Let 0 < r ≤ 1 and k ≥ 0, and consider a state s ∈ S \ (T ∪W2) such that s ∈ Ukr . For all
moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have:
1. either Destk(s, a2) ∩ Uk>r 6= ∅,
2. or Destk(s, a2) ⊆ Ukr , and there is a state t ∈ Destk(s, a2) with ℓk(t) < ℓk(s).
Proof. For convenience, let m = ℓk(s), and consider any move a2 ∈ Γ2(s).
• Consider first the case that Destk(s, a2) 6⊆ Ukr . Then, it cannot be that Destk(s, a2) ⊆ Uk≤r; other-
wise, for all states t ∈ Destk(s, a2), we would have uk(t) ≤ r, and there would be at least one state
t ∈ Destk(s, a2) such that uk(t) < r, contradicting uk(s) = r and Pre1:ηk(uk−1) = uk. So, it must
be that Destk(s, a2) ∩ Uk>r 6= ∅.
• Consider now the case that Destk(s, a2) ⊆ Ukr . Since um ≤ uk, due to the monotonicity of the Pre1
operator and (1), we have that um−1(t) ≤ r for all states t ∈ Destk(s, a2). From r = uk(s) =
um(s) = Pre1:ηk(um−1), it follows that um−1(t) = r for all states t ∈ Destk(s, a2), implying that
ℓk(t) < m for all states t ∈ Destk(s, a2).
The above lemma states that under ηk, from each state i ∈ Ukr with r > 0 we are guaranteed a probability
bounded away from 0 of either moving to a higher-value class Uk>r, or of moving to states within the value
class that have a strictly lower entry time. Note that the states in the target set T are all in U01 : they have
entry-time 0 in the value class for value 1. This implies that every state in S \W2 has a probability bounded
above zero of reaching T in at most n = |S| steps, so that the probability of staying forever in S \ (T ∪W2)
is 0. To prove this fact formally, we analyze the end components of Gηk in light of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 For all k ≥ 0, if for all states s ∈ S \W2 we have uk−1(s) > 0, then for all player-2 strategies
π2, we have Prηk,π2
(
Reach(T ∪W2)) = 1.
Proof. Since every state s ∈ (T ∪W2) is absorbing, to prove this result, in view of Corollary 1, it suffices
to show that no end component of Gηk is entirely contained in S \ (T ∪W2). Towards the contradiction,
assume there is such an end component C ⊆ S \ (T ∪W2). Then, we have C ⊆ Uk[r1,r2] with C ∩Ur2 6= ∅,
for some 0 < r1 ≤ r2 ≤ 1, where Uk[r1,r2] = Uk≥r1 ∩ Uk≤r2 is the union of the value classes for all values in
the interval [r1, r2]. Consider a state s ∈ Ukr2 with minimal ℓk, that is, such that ℓk(s) ≤ ℓk(t) for all other
states t ∈ Ukr2 . From Lemma 4, it follows that for every move a2 ∈ Γ2(s), there is a state t ∈ Destk(s, a2)
such that (i) either t ∈ Ukr2 and ℓk(t) < ℓk(s), (ii) or t ∈ Uk>r2 . In both cases, we obtain a contradiction.
The above lemma shows that ηk satisfies both requirements for optimal selectors spelt out at the begin-
ning of Section 4.2. Hence, ηk guarantees the value uk. This proves the existence of memoryless ε-optimal
strategies for concurrent reachability games.
Theorem 2 (MEMORYLESS ε-OPTIMAL STRATEGIES). For every ε > 0, memoryless ε-optimal strategies
exist for all concurrent games with reachability objectives.
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Proof. Consider a concurrent reachability game with target T ⊆ S. Since limk→∞ uk =
〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )), for every ε > 0 we can find k ∈ N such that the following two assertions hold:
max
s∈S
(〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T ))(s)− uk−1(s)) < ε
min
s∈S\W2
uk−1(s) > 0
By construction, Pre1:ηk(uk−1) = Pre1(uk−1) = uk. Hence, from Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, for all player-2
strategies π2, we have Prηk,π2(Reach(T )) ≥ uk−1, leading to the result.
5 Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Concurrent Reachability Games
In the previous section, we provided a proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for all
ε > 0, on the basis of a value-iteration scheme. In this section we present a strategy-improvement algorithm
for concurrent games with reachability objectives. The algorithm will produce a sequence of selectors
γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . for player 1, such that:
1. for all i ≥ 0, we have 〈〈1〉〉γi
val
(Reach(T )) ≤ 〈〈1〉〉γi+1
val
(Reach(T ));
2. if there is i ≥ 0 such that γi = γi+1, then 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )); and
3. limi→∞〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )).
Condition 1 guarantees that the algorithm computes a sequence of monotonically improving selectors. Con-
dition 2 guarantees that if a selector cannot be improved, then it is optimal. Condition 3 guarantees that the
value guaranteed by the selectors converges to the value of the game, or equivalently, that for all ε > 0,
there is a number i of iterations such that the memoryless player-1 strategy γi is ε-optimal. Note that for
concurrent reachability games, there may be no i ≥ 0 such that γi = γi+1, that is, the algorithm may fail
to generate an optimal selector. This is because there are concurrent reachability games that do not admit
optimal strategies, but only ε-optimal strategies for all ε > 0 [14, 10]. For turn-based reachability games,
our algorithm terminates with an optimal selector and we will present bounds for termination.
We note that the value-iteration scheme of the previous section does not directly yield a strategy-
improvement algorithm. In fact, the sequence of player-1 selectors η0, η1, η2, . . . computed in Section 4.1
may violate Condition 2: it is possible that for some i ≥ 0 we have ηi = ηi+1, but ηi 6= ηj for some j > i.
This is because the scheme of Section 4.1 is fundamentally a value-iteration scheme, even though a selector
is extracted from each valuation. The scheme guarantees that the valuations u0, u1, u2, . . . defined as in (1)
converge, but it does not guarantee that the selectors η0, η1, η2, . . . improve at each iteration.
The strategy-improvement algorithm presented here shares an important connection with the proof of
the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies presented in the previous section. Here, also, the key is
to ensure that all generated selectors are proper. Again, this is ensured by modifying the selectors, at each
iteration, only where they can be improved.
5.1 The strategy-improvement algorithm
Ordering of strategies. We let W2 be as in Section 4.1, and again we assume without loss of gener-
ality that all states in W2 ∪ T are absorbing. We define a preorder ≺ on the strategies for player 1 as
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Algorithm 1 Reachability Strategy-Improvement Algorithm
Input: a concurrent game structure G with target set T .
Output: a strategy γ for player 1.
0. Compute W2 = {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T ))(s) = 0}.
1. Let γ0 = ξunif1 and i = 0.
2. Compute v0 = 〈〈1〉〉γ0val(Reach(T )).
3. do {
3.1. Let I = {s ∈ S \ (T ∪W2) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}.
3.2. Let ξ1 be a player-1 selector such that for all states s ∈ I ,
we have Pre1:ξ1(vi)(s) = Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s).
3.3. The player-1 selector γi+1 is defined as follows: for each state s ∈ S, let
γi+1(s) =
{
γi(s) if s 6∈ I;
ξ1(s) if s ∈ I.
3.4. Compute vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉γi+1val (Reach(T )).
3.5. Let i = i+ 1.
} until I = ∅.
4. return γi.
follows: given two player 1 strategies π1 and π′1, let π1 ≺ π′1 if the following two conditions hold:
(i) 〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Reach(T )) ≤ 〈〈1〉〉π′1
val
(Reach(T )); and (ii) 〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Reach(T ))(s) < 〈〈1〉〉π′1
val
(Reach(T ))(s) for
some state s ∈ S. Furthermore, we write π1  π′1 if either π1 ≺ π′1 or π1 = π′1.
Informal description of Algorithm 1. We now present the strategy-improvement algorithm (Algorithm 1)
for computing the values for all states in S\(T ∪W2). The algorithm iteratively improves player-1 strategies
according to the preorder ≺. The algorithm starts with the random selector γ0 = ξunif1 . At iteration i + 1,
the algorithm considers the memoryless player-1 strategy γi and computes the value 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )).
Observe that since γi is a memoryless strategy, the computation of 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) involves solving the
2-MDP Gγi . The valuation 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) is named vi. For all states s such that Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s),
the memoryless strategy at s is modified to a selector that is value-optimal for vi. The algorithm then
proceeds to the next iteration. If Pre1(vi) = vi, the algorithm stops and returns the optimal memoryless
strategy γi for player 1. Unlike strategy-improvement algorithms for turn-based games (see [6] for a survey),
Algorithm 1 is not guaranteed to terminate, because the value of a reachability game may not be rational.
5.2 Convergence
Lemma 6 Let γi and γi+1 be the player-1 selectors obtained at iterations i and i+ 1 of Algorithm 1. If γi
is proper, then γi+1 is also proper.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that γi is proper and γi+1 is not. Let ξ2 be a pure selector for
player 2 to witness that γi+1 is not proper. Then there exist a subset C ⊆ S \ (T ∪W2) such that C is a
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closed recurrent set of states in the Markov chain Gγi+1,ξ2 . Let I be the nonempty set of states where the
selector is modified to obtain γi+1 from γi; at all other states γi and γi+1 agree.
Since γi and γi+1 agree at all states other than the states in I , and γi is a proper strategy, it follows
that C ∩ I 6= ∅. Let U ir = {s ∈ S \ (T ∪W2) | 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T ))(s) = vi(s) = r} be the value class
with value r at iteration i. For a state s ∈ U ir the following assertion holds: if Dest(s, γi, ξ2) ( U ir, then
Dest(s, γi, ξ2) ∩ U i>r 6= ∅. Let z = max{r | U ir ∩C 6= ∅}, that is, U iz is the greatest value class at iteration
i with a nonempty intersection with the closed recurrent set C . It easily follows that 0 < z < 1. Consider
any state s ∈ I , and let s ∈ U iq. Since Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s), it follows that Dest(s, γi+1, ξ2) ∩ U i>q 6= ∅.
Hence we must have z > q, and therefore I ∩ C ∩ U iz = ∅. Thus, for all states s ∈ U iz ∩ C , we have
γi(s) = γi+1(s). Recall that z is the greatest value class at iteration i with a nonempty intersection with C;
hence U i>z ∩ C = ∅. Thus for all states s ∈ C ∩ U iz , we have Dest(s, γi+1, ξ2) ⊆ U iz ∩ C . It follows that
C ⊆ U iz . However, this gives us three statements that together form a contradiction: C ∩ I 6= ∅ (or else γi
would not have been proper), I ∩ C ∩ U iz = ∅, and C ⊆ U iz .
Lemma 7 For all i ≥ 0, the player-1 selector γi obtained at iteration i of Algorithm 1 is proper.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we have that γ0 is proper. The result then follows from Lemma 6 and induction.
Lemma 8 Let γi and γi+1 be the player-1 selectors obtained at iterations i and i + 1 of Algorithm 1.
Let I = {s ∈ S | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}. Let vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) and vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉
γi+1
val
(Reach(T )).
Then vi+1(s) ≥ Pre1(vi)(s) for all states s ∈ S; and therefore vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all states s ∈ S, and
vi+1(s) > vi(s) for all states s ∈ I .
Proof. Consider the valuations vi and vi+1 obtained at iterations i and i+ 1, respectively, and let wi be the
valuation defined by wi(s) = 1 − vi(s) for all states s ∈ S. Since γi+1 is proper (by Lemma 7), it follows
that the counter-optimal strategy for player 2 to minimize vi+1 is obtained by maximizing the probability to
reach W2. In fact, there are no end components in S \ (W2 ∪ T ) in the 2-MDP Gγi+1 . Let
ŵi(s) =
{
wi(s) if s ∈ S \ I;
1− Pre1(vi)(s) < wi(s) if s ∈ I.
In other words, ŵi = 1 − Pre1(vi), and we also have ŵi ≤ wi. We now show that ŵi is a feasible
solution to the linear program for MDPs with the objective Reach(W2), as described in Section 3. Since
vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )), it follows that for all states s ∈ S and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
wi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi(s, a2).
For all states s ∈ S \ I , we have γi(s) = γi+1(s) and ŵi(s) = wi(s), and since ŵi ≤ wi, it follows that for
all states s ∈ S \ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
ŵi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2) (for s ∈ (S \ I)).
Since for s ∈ I the selector γi+1(s) is obtained as an optimal selector for Pre1(vi)(s), it follows that
for all states s ∈ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
Preγi+1,a2(vi)(s) ≥ Pre1(vi)(s);
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in other words, 1 − Pre1(vi)(s) ≥ 1 − Preγi+1,a2(vi)(s). Hence for all states s ∈ I and all moves
a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2).
Since ŵi ≤ wi, for all states s ∈ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
ŵi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2) ( for s ∈ I).
Hence it follows that ŵi is a feasible solution to the linear program for MDPs with reachability objectives.
Since the reachability valuation for player 2 for Reach(W2) is the least solution (observe that the objective
function of the linear program is a minimizing function), it follows that vi+1 ≥ 1 − ŵi = Pre1(vi). Thus
we obtain vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all states s ∈ S, and vi+1(s) > vi(s) for all states s ∈ I .
Theorem 3 (STRATEGY IMPROVEMENT). The following two assertions hold about Algorithm 1:
1. For all i ≥ 0, we have γi  γi+1; moreover, if γi = γi+1, then γi is an optimal strategy.
2. limi→∞ vi = limi→∞〈〈1〉〉γival(Reach(T )) = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )).
Proof. We prove the two parts as follows.
1. The assertion that γi  γi+1 follows from Lemma 8. If γi = γi+1, then Pre1(vi) = vi. Let
v = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )), and since v is the least solution to satisfy Pre1(x) = x (i.e., the least
fixpoint) [11], it follows that vi ≥ v. From Lemma 7 it follows that γi is proper. Since γi is proper by
Lemma 3, we have 〈〈1〉〉γi
val
(Reach(T )) ≥ vi ≥ v. It follows that γi is optimal for player 1.
2. Let v0 = [T ] and u0 = [T ]. We have u0 ≤ v0. For all k ≥ 0, by Lemma 8, we have vk+1 ≥
[T ] ∨ Pre1(vk). For all k ≥ 0, let uk+1 = [T ] ∨ Pre1(uk). By induction we conclude that for all
k ≥ 0, we have uk ≤ vk. Moreover, vk ≤ 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )), that is, for all k ≥ 0, we have
uk ≤ vk ≤ 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )).
Since limk→∞ uk = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )), it follows that
lim
k→∞
〈〈1〉〉γk
val
(Reach(T )) = lim
k→∞
vk = 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )).
The theorem follows.
5.3 Termination for turn-based stochastic games
If the input game structure to Algorithm 1 is a turn-based stochastic game structure, then if we start with a
proper selector γ0 that is pure, then for all i ≥ 0 we can choose the selector γi such that γi is both proper and
pure: the above claim follows since given a valuation v, if a state s is a player 1 state, then there is an action a
at s (or choice of an edge at s) that achieves Pre1(v)(s) at s. Since the number of pure selectors is bounded,
if we start with a pure, proper selector then termination is ensured. Hence we present a procedure to compute
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a pure, proper selector, and then present termination bounds (i.e., bounds on i such that ui+1 = ui). The
construction of a pure, proper selector is based on the notion of attractors defined below.
Attractor strategy. Let A0 = W2 ∪ T , and for i ≥ 0 we have
Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {s ∈ S1 ∪ SR | E(s) ∩Ai 6= ∅} ∪ {s ∈ S2 | E(s) ⊆ Ai}.
Since for all s ∈ S \W2 we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )) > 0, it follows that from all states in S \W2 player 1
can ensure that T is reached with positive probability. It follows that for some i ≥ 0 we have Ai = S. The
pure attractor selector ξ∗ is as follows: for a state s ∈ (Ai+1 \Ai)∩S1 we have ξ∗(s)(t) = 1, where t ∈ Ai
(such a t exists by construction). The pure memoryless strategy ξ∗ ensures that for all i ≥ 0, from Ai+1 the
game reaches Ai with positive probability. Hence there is no end-component C contained in S \ (W2 ∪ T )
in the MDP Gξ∗ . It follows that ξ∗ is a pure selector that is proper, and the selector ξ∗ can be computed in
O(|E|) time. We now present the termination bounds.
Termination bounds. We present termination bounds for binary turn-based stochastic games. A turn-based
stochastic game is binary if for all s ∈ SR we have |E(s)| ≤ 2, and for all s ∈ SR if |E(s)| = 2, then for
all t ∈ E(s) we have δ(s)(t) = 12 , i.e., for all probabilistic states there are at most two successors and the
transition function δ is uniform.
Lemma 9 Let G be a binary Markov chain with |S| states with a reachability objective Reach(T ). Then
for all s ∈ S we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )) = pq , with p, q ∈ N and p, q ≤ 4|S|−1.
Proof. The results follow as a special case of Lemma 2 of [6]. Lemma 2 of [6] holds for halting turn-
based stochastic games, and since Markov chains reaches the set of closed connected recurrent states with
probability 1 from all states the result follows.
Lemma 10 Let G be a binary turn-based stochastic game with a reachability objective Reach(T ). Then
for all s ∈ S we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Reach(T )) = pq , with p, q ∈ N and p, q ≤ 4|SR|−1.
Proof. Since pure memoryless optimal strategies exist for both players (existence of pure memoryless
optimal strategies for both players in turn-based stochastic reachability games follows from [5]), we fix pure
memoryless optimal strategies π1 and π2 for both players. The Markov chain Gπ1,π2 can be then reduced
to an equivalent Markov chains with |SR| states (since we fix deterministic successors for states in S1 ∪ S2,
they can be collapsed to their successors). The result then follows from Lemma 9.
From Lemma 10 it follows that at iteration i of the reachability strategy improvement algorithm either
the sum of the values either increases by 1
4|SR|−1
or else there is a valuation ui such that ui+1 = ui. Since
the sum of values of all states can be at most |S|, it follows that algorithm terminates in at most |S| · 4|SR|−1
iterations. Moreover, since the number of pure memoryless strategies is at most
∏
s∈S1
|E(s)|, the algorithm
terminates in at most
∏
s∈S1
|E(s)| iterations. It follows from the results of [28] that a turn-based stochastic
game structure G can be reduced to a equivalent binary turn-based stochastic game structure G′ such that
the set of player 1 and player 2 states in G and G′ are the same and the number of probabilistic states in G′
is O(|δ|), where |δ| is the size of the transition function in G. Thus we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 Let G be a turn-based stochastic game with a reachability objective Reach(T ), then the reach-
ability strategy improvement algorithm computes the values in time
O
(
min{
∏
s∈S1
|E(s)|, 2O(|δ|)} · poly(|G|);
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where poly is polynomial function.
The results of [16] presented an algorithm for turn-based stochastic games that works in time O(|SR|! ·
poly(|G|)). The algorithm of [16] works only for turn-based stochastic games, for general turn-based
stochastic games the complexity of the algorithm of [16] is better. However, for turn-based stochastic games
where the transition function at all states can be expressed with constantly many bits we have |δ| = O(|SR|).
In these cases the reachability strategy improvement algorithm (that works for both concurrent and turn-
based stochastic games) works in time 2O(|SR|)·poly(|G|) as compared to the time 2O(|SR|·log(|SR|)·poly(|G|)
of the algorithm of [16].
6 Existence of Memoryless Optimal Strategies for Concurrent Safety
Games
A proof of the existence of memoryless optimal strategies for safety games can be found in [11]: the proof
uses results on martingales to obtain the result. For sake of completeness we present (an alternative) proof
of the result: the proof we present is similar in spirit with the other proofs in this paper and uses the results
on MDPs to obtain the result. The proof is very similar to the proof presented in [13].
Theorem 5 (MEMORYLESS OPTIMAL STRATEGIES). Memoryless optimal strategies exist for all concur-
rent games with safety objectives.
Proof. Consider a concurrent game structure G with an safety objective Safe(F ) for player 1. Then it
follows from the results of [11] that
〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) = νX.
(
min{[F ],Pre1(X)}
)
,
where [F ] is the indicator function of the set F and ν denotes the greatest fixpoint. Let T = S \ F , and for
all states s ∈ T we have 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) = 0, and hence any memoryless strategy from T is an optimal
strategy. Thus without loss of generality we assume all states in T are absorbing. Let v = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )),
and since we assume all states in T are absorbing it follows that Pre1(v) = v (since v is a fixpoint). Let γ
be a player 1 selector such that for all states s we have Pre1:γ(v)(s) = Pre1(v)(s) = v(s). We show that γ
is an memoryless optimal strategy. Consider the player-2 MDP Gγ and we consider the maximal probability
for player 2 to reach the target set T . Consider the valuation w defined as w = 1 − v. For all states s ∈ T
we have w(s) = 1. Since Pre1:γ(v) = Pre1(v) it follows that for all states s ∈ F and all a2 ∈ Γ2(s) we
have
Preγ,a2(v)(s) ≥ Pre1(v)(s) = v(s);
in other words, for all s ∈ F we have 1−Pre1(v)(s) = 1− v(s) ≥ 1−Preγ,a2(v)(s). Hence for all states
s ∈ F and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
w(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
w(t) · δγ(s, a2).
Hence it follows that w is a feasible solution to the linear program for MDPs with reachability objectives,
i.e., given the memoryless strategy γ for player 1 the maximal probability valuation for player 2 to reach T
is at most w. Hence the memoryless strategy γ ensures that the probability valaution for player 1 to stay
safe in F against all player 2 strategies is at least v = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )). Optimality of γ follows.
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7 Strategy Improvement Algorithm for Concurrent Safety Games
In this section we present a strategy improvement algorithm for concurrent games with safety objectives.
We consider a concurrent game structure with a safe set F , i.e., the objective for player 1 is Safe(F ). The
algorithm will produce a sequence of selectors γ0, γ1, γ2, . . . for player 1, such that Condition 1, Condition 2
and Condition 3 of Section 5 are satisfied. Note that for concurrent safety games, there may be no i ≥ 0
such that γi = γi+1, that is, the algorithm may fail to generate an optimal selector, as the value can be
irrational [11]. We start with a few notations
Optimal selectors. Given a valuation v and a state s, we define by
OptSel(v, s) = {ξ1 ∈ Λ1(s) | Pre1:ξ1(v)(s) = Pre1(v)(s)}
the set of optimal selectors for v at state s. For an optimal selector ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s), we define the set of
counter-optimal actions as follows:
CountOpt(v, s, ξ1) = {b ∈ Γ2(s) | Preξ1,b(v)(s) = Pre1(v)(s)}.
Observe that for ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s), for all b ∈ Γ2(s) \ CountOpt(v, s, ξ1) we have Preξ1,b(v)(s) >
Pre1(v)(s). We define the set of optimal selector support and the counter-optimal action set as follows:
OptSelCount(v, s) = {(A,B) ⊆ Γ1(s)× Γ2(s) | ∃ξ1 ∈ Λ1(s). ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s)
∧ Supp(ξ1) = A ∧ CountOpt(v, s, ξ1) = B};
i.e., it consists of pairs (A,B) of actions of player 1 and player 2, such that there is an optimal selector ξ1
with support A, and B is the set of counter-optimal actions to ξ1.
Turn-based reduction. Given a concurrent game G = 〈S,M,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉 and a valuation v we construct a
turn-based stochastic game Gv = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SR), δ〉 as follows:
1. The set of states is as follows:
S = S ∪ {(s,A,B) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s)}
∪ {(s,A, b) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s), b ∈ B}.
2. The state space partition is as follows: S1 = S; S2 = {(s,A,B) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈
OptSelCount(v, s)}; and SR = {(s,A, b) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s), b ∈ B}. In other
words, (S1, S2, SR) is a partition of the state space, where S1 are player 1 states, S2 are player 2
states, and SR are random or probabilistic states.
3. The set of edges is as follows:
E = {(s, (s,A,B)) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s)}
∪ {((s,A,B), (s,A, b)) | b ∈ B} ∪ {((s,A, b), t) | t ∈
⋃
a∈A
Dest(s, a, b)}.
4. The transition function δ for all states in SR is uniform over its successors.
20
Intuitively, the reduction is as follows. Given the valuation v, state s is a player 1 state where player 1 can
select a pair (A,B) (and move to state (s,A,B)) with A ⊆ Γ1(s) and B ⊆ Γ2(s) such that there is an
optimal selector ξ1 with support exactly A and the set of counter-optimal actions to ξ1 is the set B. From a
player 2 state (s,A,B), player 2 can choose any action b from the set B, and move to state (s,A, b). A state
(s,A, b) is a probabilistic state where all the states in
⋃
a∈ADest(s, a, b) are chosen uniformly at random.
Given a set F ⊆ S we denote by F = F ∪ {(s,A,B) ∈ S | s ∈ F} ∪ {(s,A, b) ∈ S | s ∈ F}. We refer to
the above reduction as TB, i.e., (Gv, F ) = TB(G, v, F ).
Value-class of a valuation. Given a valuation v and a real 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, the value-class Ur(v) of value r is
the set of states with valuation r, i.e., Ur(v) = {s ∈ S | v(s) = r}
7.1 The strategy-improvement algorithm
Ordering of strategies. Let G be a concurrent game and F be the set of safe states. Let T = S \ F .
Given a concurrent game structure G with a safety objective Safe(F ), the set of almost-sure winning states
is the set of states s such that the value at s is 1, i.e., W1 = {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) = 1} is the set
of almost-sure winning states. An optimal strategy from W1 is referred as an almost-sure winning strategy.
The set W1 and an almost-sure winning strategy can be computed in linear time by the algorithm given
in [9]. We assume without loss of generality that all states in W1 ∪ T are absorbing. We recall the preorder
≺ on the strategies for player 1 (as defined in Section 5.1) as follows: given two player 1 strategies π1
and π′1, let π1 ≺ π′1 if the following two conditions hold: (i) 〈〈1〉〉π1val(Safe(F )) ≤ 〈〈1〉〉
π′1
val
(Safe(F )); and
(ii) 〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Safe(F ))(s) < 〈〈1〉〉π′1
val
(Safe(F ))(s) for some state s ∈ S. Furthermore, we write π1  π′1 if
either π1 ≺ π′1 or π1 = π′1. We first present an example that shows the improvements based only on Pre1
operators are not sufficient for safety games, even on turn-based games and then present our algorithm.
Example 2 Consider the turn-based stochastic game shown in Fig 2, where the ✷ states are player 1 states,
the ✸ states are player 2 states, and © states are random states with probabilities labeled on edges. The
safety goal is to avoid the state s4. Consider a memoryless strategy π1 for player 1 that chooses the successor
s0 → s2, and the counter-strategy π2 for player 2 chooses s1 → s0. Given the strategies π1 and π2, the
value at s0, s1 and s2 is 1/3, and since all successors of s0 have value 1/3, the value cannot be improved by
Pre1. However, note that if player 2 is restricted to choose only value optimal selectors for the value 1/3,
then player 1 can switch to the strategy s0 → s1 and ensure that the game stays in the value class 1/3 with
probability 1. Hence switching to s0 → s1 would force player 2 to select a counter-strategy that switches to
the strategy s1 → s3, and thus player 1 can get a value 2/3.
Informal description of Algorithm 2. We first present the basic strategy improvement algorithm (Algo-
rithm 2) and will later present a convergent version (Algorithm 4) for computing the values for all states in
S \W1. The algorithm (Algorithm 2) iteratively improves player-1 strategies according to the preorder ≺.
The algorithm starts with the random selector γ0 = ξ
unif
1 that plays at all states all actions uniformly at ran-
dom. At iteration i+1, the algorithm considers the memoryless player-1 strategy γi and computes the value
〈〈1〉〉γi
val
(Safe(F )). Observe that since γi is a memoryless strategy, the computation of 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )) in-
volves solving the 2-MDP Gγi . The valuation 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )) is named vi. For all states s such that
Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s), the memoryless strategy at s is modified to a selector that is value-optimal for vi.
The algorithm then proceeds to the next iteration. If Pre1(vi) = vi, then the algorithm constructs the game
(Gvi , F ) = TB(G, vi, F ), and computes Ai as the set of almost-sure winning states in Gvi for the objective
Safe(F ). Let U = (Ai ∩ S) \W1. If U is non-empty, then a selector γi+1 is obtained at U from an pure
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Figure 2: A turn-based stochastic safety game.
memoryless optimal strategy (i.e., an almost-sure winning strategy) in Gvi , and the algorithm proceeds to
iteration i + 1. If Pre1(vi) = vi and U is empty, then the algorithm stops and returns the memoryless
strategy γi for player 1. Unlike strategy improvement algorithms for turn-based games (see [6] for a sur-
vey), Algorithm 2 is not guaranteed to terminate (see Example 3). We will show that Algorithm 2 has both
the monotonicity and optimality on termination properties, however, as we will illustrate in Example 3, the
valuations of Algorithm 2 need not necessarily converge to the values. However, for turn-based stochastic
games Algorithm 2 correctly converges to the values. We will show that Algorithm 4 has all the desired
properties (i.e., monotonicity, optimality on termination, and convergence to the values).
Lemma 11 Let γi and γi+1 be the player-1 selectors obtained at iterations i and i+ 1 of Algorithm 2. Let
I = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}. Let vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )) and vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉
γi+1
val
(Safe(F )).
Then vi+1(s) ≥ Pre1(vi)(s) for all states s ∈ S; and therefore vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all states s ∈ S, and
vi+1(s) > vi(s) for all states s ∈ I .
Proof. The proof is essentially similar to the proof of Lemma 8, and we present the details for completeness.
Consider the valuations vi and vi+1 obtained at iterations i and i+1, respectively, and let wi be the valuation
defined by wi(s) = 1 − vi(s) for all states s ∈ S. The counter-optimal strategy for player 2 to minimize
vi+1 is obtained by maximizing the probability to reach T . Let
ŵi(s) =
{
wi(s) if s ∈ S \ I;
1− Pre1(vi)(s) < wi(s) if s ∈ I.
In other words, ŵi = 1 − Pre1(vi), and we also have ŵi ≤ wi. We now show that ŵi is a feasible
solution to the linear program for MDPs with the objective Reach(T ), as described in Section 3. Since
vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )), it follows that for all states s ∈ S and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
wi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi(s, a2).
For all states s ∈ S \ I , we have γi(s) = γi+1(s) and ŵi(s) = wi(s), and since ŵi ≤ wi, it follows that for
all states s ∈ S \ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) = wi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
ŵi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2) ( for s ∈ S \ I).
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Algorithm 2 Safety Strategy-Improvement Algorithm
Input: a concurrent game structure G with safe set F .
Output: a strategy γ for player 1.
0. Compute W1 = {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) = 1}.
1. Let γ0 = ξunif1 and i = 0.
2. Compute v0 = 〈〈1〉〉γ0val(Safe(F )).
3. do {
3.1. Let I = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}.
3.2 if I 6= ∅, then
3.2.1 Let ξ1 be a player-1 selector such that for all states s ∈ I ,
we have Pre1:ξ1(vi)(s) = Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s).
3.2.2 The player-1 selector γi+1 is defined as follows: for each state s ∈ S, let
γi+1(s) =
{
γi(s) if s 6∈ I;
ξ1(s) if s ∈ I.
3.3 else
3.3.1 let(Gvi , F ) = TB(G, vi, F )
3.3.2 let Ai be the set of almost-sure winning states in Gvi for Safe(F ) and
π1 be a pure memoryless almost-sure winning strategy from the set Ai.
3.3.3 if ((Ai ∩ S) \W1 6= ∅)
3.3.3.1 let U = (Ai ∩ S) \W1
3.3.3.2 The player-1 selector γi+1 is defined as follows: for s ∈ S, let
γi+1(s) =

γi(s) if s 6∈ U ;
ξ1(s) if s ∈ U, ξ1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s),Supp(ξ1(s)) = A,
π1(s) = (s,A,B), B = CountOpt(s, v, ξ1).
3.4. Compute vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉γi+1val (Safe(F )).
3.5. Let i = i+ 1.
} until I = ∅ and (Ai−1 ∩ S) \W1 = ∅.
4. return γi.
Since for s ∈ I the selector γi+1(s) is obtained as an optimal selector for Pre1(vi)(s), it follows that
for all states s ∈ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
Preγi+1,a2(vi)(s) ≥ Pre1(vi)(s);
in other words, 1 − Pre1(vi)(s) ≥ 1 − Preγi+1,a2(vi)(s). Hence for all states s ∈ I and all moves
a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2).
Since ŵi ≤ wi, for all states s ∈ I and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
ŵi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
ŵi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2) ( for s ∈ I).
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Hence it follows that ŵi is a feasible solution to the linear program for MDPs with reachability objectives.
Since the reachability valuation for player 2 for Reach(T ) is the least solution (observe that the objective
function of the linear program is a minimizing function), it follows that vi+1 ≥ 1 − ŵi = Pre1(vi). Thus
we obtain vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all states s ∈ S, and vi+1(s) > vi(s) for all states s ∈ I .
Recall that by Example 2 it follows that improvement by only step 3.2 is not sufficient to guarantee
convergence to optimal values. We now present a lemma about the turn-based reduction, and then show that
step 3.3 also leads to an improvement. Finally, in Theorem 7 we show that if improvements by step 3.2 and
step 3.3 are not possible, then the optimal value and an optimal strategy is obtained.
Lemma 12 Let G be a concurrent game with a set F of safe states. Let v be a valuation and consider
(Gv, F ) = TB(G, v, F ). Let A be the set of almost-sure winning states in Gv for the objective Safe(F ),
and let π1 be a pure memoryless almost-sure winning strategy from A in Gv. Consider a memoryless
strategy π1 in G for states in A ∩ S as follows: if π1(s) = (s,A,B), then π1(s) ∈ OptSel(v, s) such that
Supp(π1(s)) = A and CountOpt(v, s, π1(s)) = B. Consider a pure memoryless strategy π2 for player 2.
If for all states s ∈ A ∩ S, we have π2(s) ∈ CountOpt(v, s, π1(s)), then for all s ∈ A ∩ S, we have
Prπ1,π2s (Safe(F )) = 1.
Proof. We analyze the Markov chain arising after the player fixes the memoryless strategies π1 and
π2. Given the strategy π2 consider the strategy π2 as follows: if π1(s) = (s,A,B) and π2(s) = b ∈
CountOpt(v, s, π1(s)), then at state (s,A,B) choose the successor (s,A, b). Since π1 is an almost-sure
winning strategy for Safe(F ), it follows that in the Markov chain obtained by fixing π1 and π2 in Gv, all
closed connected recurrent set of states that intersect with A are contained in A, and from all states of A
the closed connected recurrent set of states within A are reached with probability 1. It follows that in the
Markov chain obtained from fixing π1 and π2 in G all closed connected recurrent set of states that intersect
with A ∩ S are contained in A ∩ S, and from all states of A ∩ S the closed connected recurrent set of states
within A ∩ S are reached with probability 1. The desired result follows.
Lemma 13 Let γi and γi+1 be the player-1 selectors obtained at iterations i and i+ 1 of Algorithm 2. Let
I = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)} = ∅, and (Ai ∩ S) \W1 6= ∅. Let vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F ))
and vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉γi+1val (Safe(F )). Then vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all states s ∈ S, and vi+1(s) > vi(s) for some
state s ∈ (Ai ∩ S) \W1.
Proof. We first show that vi+1 ≥ vi. Let U = (Ai ∩ S) \W1. Let wi(s) = 1− vi(s) for all states s ∈ S.
Since vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )), it follows that for all states s ∈ S and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
wi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi(s, a2).
The selector ξ1(s) chosen for γi+1 at s ∈ U satisfies that ξ1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s). It follows that for all states
s ∈ S and all moves a2 ∈ Γ2(s), we have
wi(s) ≥
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi+1(s, a2).
It follows that the maximal probability with which player 2 can reach T against the strategy γi+1 is at most
wi. It follows that vi(s) ≤ vi+1(s).
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We now argue that for some state s ∈ U we have vi+1(s) > vi(s). Given the strategy γi+1, consider a
pure memoryless counter-optimal strategy π2 for player 2 to reach T . Since the selectors γi+1(s) at states
s ∈ U are obtained from the almost-sure strategy π in the turn-based game Gvi to satisfy Safe(F ), it follows
from Lemma 12 that if for every state s ∈ U , the action π2(s) ∈ CountOpt(vi, s, γi+1), then from all states
s ∈ U , the game stays safe in F with probability 1. Since γi+1 is a given strategy for player 1, and π2 is
counter-optimal against γi+1, this would imply that U ⊆ {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) = 1}. This would
contradict that W1 = {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) = 1} and U ∩W1 = ∅. It follows that for some state
s∗ ∈ U we have π2(s∗) 6∈ CountOpt(vi, s∗, γi+1), and since γi+1(s∗) ∈ OptSel(vi, s∗) we have
vi(s
∗) <
∑
t∈S
vi(t) · δγi+1(s∗, π2(s∗));
in other words, we have
wi(s
∗) >
∑
t∈S
wi(t) · δγi+1(s∗, π2(s∗)).
Define a valuation z as follows: z(s) = wi(s) for s 6= s∗, and z(s∗) =
∑
t∈S wi(t) · δγi+1(s∗, π2(s∗)).
Given the strategy γi+1 and the counter-optimal strategy π2, the valuation z satisfies the inequalities of the
linear-program for reachability to T . It follows that the probability to reach T given γi+1 is at most z. Thus
we obtain that vi+1(s) ≥ vi(s) for all s ∈ S, and vi+1(s∗) > vi(s∗). This concludes the proof.
We obtain the following theorem from Lemma 11 and Lemma 13 that shows that the sequences of values
we obtain is monotonically non-decreasing.
Theorem 6 (MONOTONICITY OF VALUES). For i ≥ 0, let γi and γi+1 be the player-1 selectors obtained
at iterations i and i+ 1 of Algorithm 2. If γi 6= γi+1, then (a) for all s ∈ S we have 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F ))(s) ≤
〈〈1〉〉γi+1
val
(Safe(F ))(s); and (b) for some s∗ ∈ S we have 〈〈1〉〉γi
val
(Safe(F ))(s∗) < 〈〈1〉〉γi+1
val
(Safe(F ))(s∗).
Theorem 7 (OPTIMALITY ON TERMINATION). Let vi be the valuation at iteration i of Algorithm 2 such
that vi = 〈〈1〉〉γival(Safe(F )). If I = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪T ) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)} = ∅, and (Ai∩S) \W1 = ∅,
then γi is an optimal strategy and vi = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )).
Proof. We show that for all memoryless strategies π1 for player 1 we have 〈〈1〉〉π1val(Safe(F )) ≤ vi. Since
memoryless optimal strategies exist for concurrent games with safety objectives (Theorem 5) the desired
result follows.
Let π2 be a pure memoryless optimal strategy for player 2 in Gvi for the objective complementary to
Safe(F ), where (Gvi ,Safe(F )) = TB(G, vi, F ). Consider a memoryless strategy π1 for player 1, and we
define a pure memoryless strategy π2 for player 2 as follows.
1. If π1(s) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s), then π2(s) = b ∈ Γ2(s), such that Preπ1(s),b(vi)(s) < vi(s); (such a b
exists since π1(s) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s)).
2. If π1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s), then let A = Supp(π1(s)), and consider B such that B =
CountOpt(vi, s, π1(s)). Then we have π2(s) = b, such that π2((s,A,B)) = (s,A, b).
Observe that by construction of π2, for all s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ), we have Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s). We
first show that in the Markov chain obtained by fixing π1 and π2 in G, there is no closed connected recurrent
set of states C such that C ⊆ S \ (W1 ∪ T ). Assume towards contradiction that C is a closed connected
recurrent set of states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ). The following case analysis achieves the contradiction.
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1. Suppose for every state s ∈ C we have π1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s). Then consider the strategy
π1 in Gvi such that for a state s ∈ C we have π1(s) = (s,A,B), where π1(s) = A, and
B = CountOpt(vi, s, π1(s)). Since C is closed connected recurrent states, it follows by con-
struction that for all states s ∈ C in the game Gvi we have Prπ1,π2s (Safe(C)) = 1, where
C = C ∪ {(s,A,B) | s ∈ C} ∪ {(s,A, b) | s ∈ C}. It follows that for all s ∈ C in Gvi we
have Prπ1,π2s (Safe(F )) = 1. Since π2 is an optimal strategy, it follows that C ⊆ (Ai ∩ S) \W1. This
contradicts that (Ai ∩ S) \W1 = ∅.
2. Otherwise for some state s∗ ∈ C we have π1(s∗) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s∗). Let r = min{q | Uq(vi)∩C 6= ∅},
i.e., r is the least value-class with non-empty intersection with C . Hence it follows that for all q < r,
we have Uq(vi)∩C = ∅. Observe that since for all s ∈ C we have Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s), it fol-
lows that for all s ∈ Ur(vi) either (a) Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s)) ⊆ Ur(vi); or (b) Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s)) ∩
Uq(vi) 6= ∅, for some q < r. Since Ur(vi) is the least value-class with non-empty intersection with C ,
it follows that for all s ∈ Ur(vi) we have Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s)) ⊆ Ur(vi). It follows that C ⊆ Ur(vi).
Consider the state s∗ ∈ C such that π1(s∗) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s). By the construction of π2(s), we have
Preπ1(s∗),π2(s∗)(vi)(s
∗) < vi(s
∗). Hence we must have Dest(s∗, π1(s∗), π2(s∗)) ∩ Uq(vi) 6= ∅, for
some q < r. Thus we have a contradiction.
It follows from above that there is no closed connected recurrent set of states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ), and hence
with probability 1 the game reaches W1 ∪ T from all states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ). Hence the probability to
satisfy Safe(F ) is equal to the probability to reach W1. Since for all states s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) we have
Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s), it follows that given the strategies π1 and π2, the valuation vi satisfies all the
inequalities for linear program to reach W1. It follows that the probability to reach W1 from s is atmost
vi(s). It follows that for all s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) we have 〈〈1〉〉π1val(Safe(F ))(s) ≤ vi(s). The result follows.
k-uniform selectors and strategies. For concurrent games, we will use the result that for ε > 0, there
is a k-uniform memoryless strategy that achieves the value of a safety objective within ε. We first define
k-uniform selectors and k-uniform memoryless strategies. For a positive integer k > 0, a selector ξ for
player 1 is k-uniform if for all s ∈ S \ (T ∪W1) and all a ∈ Supp(π1(s)) there exists i, j ∈ N such that
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k and ξ(s)(a) = i
j
, i.e., the moves in the support are played with probability that are multiples
of 1
ℓ
with ℓ ≤ k. We denote by Λk the set of k-uniform selectors. A memoryless strategy is k-uniform if it
is obtained from a k-uniform selector. We denote by ΠM,k1 the set of k-uniform memoryless strategies for
player 1. We first present a technical lemma (Lemma 14) that will be used in the key lemma (Lemma 15) to
prove the convergence result.
Lemma 14 Let a1, a2, . . . , am be m real numbers such that (1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have ai > 0; and
(2)∑mi=1 ai = 1. Let c = min1≤i≤m ai. For η > 0, there exists k ≥ mc·η and m real numbers b1, b2, . . . , bm
such that (1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have bi is a multiple of 1k and bi > 0; (2)
∑m
i=1 bi = 1; and (3) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have ai
bi
≤ 1 + η and bi
ai
≤ 1 + η.
Proof. Let ℓ = m
η·c . For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define bi such that bi is a multiple of 1ℓ and ai ≤ bi ≤ ai+ 1ℓ (basically
define bi as the least multiple of 1ℓ that is at least the value of ai). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let bi = bi∑m
i=1 bi
; i.e., bi is
defined from bi with normalization. Clearly,
∑m
i=1 bi = 1, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have bi > 0 and bi can
be expressed as a multiple of 1
k
, for some k ≥ m
η·c . We have the following inequalities: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
we have
bi ≤ ai + 1
ℓ
; bi ≥ ai
1 + m
ℓ
.
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The first inequality follows since bi ≤ ai + 1ℓ and
∑m
i=1 bi ≥
∑m
i=1 ai = 1. The second inequality follows
since bi ≥ ai and
∑m
i=1 bi ≤
∑m
i=1(ai +
1
ℓ
) =
∑m
i=1 ai +
m
ℓ
= 1 + m
ℓ
. Hence for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
bi
ai
≤ 1 + 1
ℓ · ai ≤ 1 +
1
ℓ · c ≤ 1 + η;
ai
bi
≤ 1 + m
ℓ
≤ 1 + η · c ≤ 1 + η.
The desired result follows.
Lemma 15 For all concurrent game structures G, for all safety objectives Safe(F ), for F ⊆ S, for all
ε > 0, there exist k > 0 and k-uniform selectors ξ such that ξ is an ε-optimal strategy.
Proof. Our proof uses a result of Solan [27] and the existence of memoryless optimal strategies for concur-
rent safety games (Theorem 5). We first present the result of Solan specialized for MDPs with reachability
objectives.
The result of [27]. Let G = (S,M,Γ2, δ) and G′ = (S,M,Γ2, δ′) be two player-2 MDPs defined on the
same state space S, with the same move set M and the same move assignment function Γ2, but with two
different transition functions δ and δ′, respectively. Let
ρ(G,G′) = max
s,t∈S,a2∈Γ2(s)
{
δ(s, a2)(t)
δ′(s, a2)(t)
,
δ′(s, a2)(t)
δ(s, a2)(t)
}
− 1;
where by convention x/0 = +∞ for x > 0, and 0/0 = 1 (compare with equation (9) of [27]: ρ(G,G′)
is obtained as a specialization of (9) of [27] for MDPs). Let T ⊆ S. For s ∈ S, let v(s) and v′(s) denote
the value for player 2 for the reachability objective Reach(T ) from s in G and G′, respectively. Then from
Theorem 6 of [27] (also see equation (10) of [27]) it follows that
−4 · |S| · ρ(G,G′) ≤ v(s)− v′(s) ≤ 4 · |S| · ρ(G,G
′)
(1− 2 · |S| · ρ(G,G′))+ ; (2)
where x+ = max{x, 0}. We first explain how specialization of Theorem 6 of [27] yields (2). Theorem 6
of [27] was proved for value functions of discounted games with costs, even when the discount factor
λ = 0. Since the value functions of limit-average games are obtained as the limit of the value functions
of discounted games as the discount factor goes to 0 [23], the result of Theorem 6 of [27] also holds for
concurrent limit-average games (this was the main result of [27]). Since reachability objectives are special
case of limit-average objectives, Theorem 6 of [27] also holds for reachability objectives. In the special
case of reachability objectives with the same target set, the different cost functions used in equation (10)
of [27] coincide, and the maximum absolute value of the cost is 1. Thus we obtain (2) as a specialization of
Theorem 6 of [27].
We now use the existence of memoryless optimal strategies in concurrent safety games, and (2) to obtain
our desired result. Consider a concurrent safety game G = (S,M,Γ1,Γ2, δ) with safe set F for player 1.
Let π1 be a memoryless optimal strategy for the objective Safe(F ). Let c = mins∈S,a1∈Γ1(s){π1(s)(a1) |
π1(s)(a1) > 0} be the minimum positive transition probability given by π1. Given ε > 0, let η =
min{ 14·|S| , ε8·|S|}. We define a memoryless strategy π′1 satisfying the following conditions: for s ∈ S and
a1 ∈ Γ1(s) we have
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1. if π1(s)(a1) = 0, then π′1(s)(a1) = 0;
2. if π1(s)(a1) > 0, then following conditions are satisfied:
(a) π′1(s)(a1) > 0;
(b) π1(s)(a1)
π′1(s)(a1)
≤ 1 + η;
(c) π′1(s)(a1)
π1(s)(a1)
≤ 1 + η; and
(d) π′1(s)(a1) is a multiple of 1k , for an integer k > 0 (such a k exists for k > |M |c·η ).
For k > |M |
c·η , such a strategy π
′
1 exists (follows from the construction of Lemma 14). Let G1 and G′1 be
the two player-2 MDPs obtained from G by fixing the memoryless strategies π1 and π′1, respectively. Then
by definition of π′1 we have ρ(G1, G′1) ≤ η. Let T = S \ F . For s ∈ S, let the value of player 2 for the
objective Reach(T ) in G1 and G′1 be v(s) and v′(s), respectively. By (2) we have
−4 · |S| · η ≤ v(s)− v′(s) ≤ 4 · |S| · η
(1− 2 · |S| · η)+ ;
Observe that by choice of η we have (a) 4 · |S| · η ≤ ε2·|S| and (b) 2 · |S| · η ≤ 12 . Hence we have
−ε ≤ v(s) − v′(s) ≤ ε. Since π1 is a memoryless optimal strategy, it follows that π′1 is a k-uniform
memoryless ε-optimal strategy.
Turn-based stochastic games convergence. We first observe that since pure memoryless optimal strategies
exist for turn-based stochastic games with safety objectives (the results follows from results of [5, 22]), for
turn-based stochastic games it suffices to iterate over pure memoryless selectors. Since the number of pure
memoryless strategies is finite, it follows for turn-based stochastic games Algorithm 2 always terminates
and yields an optimal strategy. In other words, we can restrict the selectors used in Algorithm 2 in Steps
3.2.2 and 3.3.2.2 to be pure memoryless selectors. Then the local improvement steps of Algorithm 2 with
pure memoryless selectors terminates, and by Theorem 7 yield a globally optimal pure memoryless strategy
(which is an optimal strategy). We will use the argument for turn-based stochastic games to a variant of
Algorithm 2 restricted to k-uniform selectors.
Strategy improvement with k-uniform selectors. We now present the variant of Algorithm 2 where we
restrict the algorithm to k-uniform selectors. The notations are essentially the same as used in Algorithm 2,
but restricted to k-uniform selectors and presented as Algorithm 3. (for example, Gkvi is similar to Gvi
but restricted to k-uniform selectors, and similarly OptSel(vi, s, k) are the optimal k-uniform selectors, see
Section 8 for complete details). We first argue that if we restrict Algorithm 2 such that every iteration yields
a k-uniform selector, for k > 0, then the algorithm terminates, i.e., Algorithm 3 terminates. The basic
argument that if Algorithm 2 is restricted to k-uniform selectors for player 1, for k > 0, then the algorithm
terminates, follows from the facts that (i) the sequence of strategies obtained are monotonic (Theorem 6)
(i.e., the algorithm does not cycle among k-uniform selectors); and (ii) the number of k-uniform selectors
for a given k is finite. Given k > 0, let us denote by zki the valuation of Algorithm 3 at iteration i.
Lemma 16 For all k > 0, there exists i ≥ 0 such that zki = zki+1.
Convergence to optimal k-uniform memoryless strategies. We now argue that the valuation Algorithm 3
converges to is optimal for k-uniform selectors. The argument is as follows: if we restrict player 1 to
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chose between k-uniform selectors, then a concurrent game structures G can be converted to a turn-based
stochastic game structure, where player 1 first chooses a k-uniform selector, then player 2 chooses an action,
and then the transition is determined by the chosen k-uniform selector of player 1, the action of player 2
and the transition function δ of the game structure G. Then by termination of turn-based stochastic games
it follows that the algorithm will terminate. It follows from Theorem 7 that upon termination we obtain
optimal strategy for the turn-based stochastic game. In other words, as discussed above for turn-based
stochastic game, the local iteration converges to a globally optimal strategy. Hence the valuation obtained
upon termination is the maximal value obtained over all k-uniform memoryless strategies. This gives us the
following lemma (also see appendix for a detailed proof).
Lemma 17 For all k > 0, let i ≥ 0 be such that zki = zki+1. Then we have zki =
max
π1∈Π
M,k
1
infπ2∈Π2 Pr
π1,π2(Safe(F )).
Lemma 18 For all concurrent game structures G, for all safety objectives Safe(F ), for F ⊆ S, for all
ε > 0, there exist k > 0 and i ≥ 0 such that for all s ∈ S we have zki (s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε.
Proof. By Lemma 15, for all ε > 0, there exists k > 0 such that there is a k-uniform memoryless ε-
optimal strategy for player 1. By Lemma 16, for all k > 0, there exists an i ≥ 0 such that zki = zki+1,
and by Lemma 17 it follows that the valuation zik represents the maximal value obtained by k-uniform
memoryless strategies. Hence it follows that there exists k > 0 and i ≥ 0 such that for all s ∈ S we have
zki (s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε. The desired result follows.
We now present the convergent strategy improvement algorithm for safety objectives as Algorithm 4 that
iterates over k-uniform strategy values. The algorithm iteratively calls Algorithm 3 with larger k, unless the
termination condition of Algorithm 2 is satisfied.
Theorem 8 (MONOTONICITY, OPTIMALITY ON TERMINATION AND CONVERGENCE). Let vi be the
valuation obtained at iteration i of Algorithm 4. Then the following assertions hold.
1. For all i ≥ 0 we have vi+1 ≥ vi.
2. If the algorithm terminates, then vi = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )).
3. For all ε > 0, there exists i such that for all s we have vi(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε.
4. limi→∞ vi = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )).
Proof. We prove the results as follows.
1. Let vi is the valuation of Algorithm 4 at iteration i. For k > 0, we consider zki to denote the valuation
of Algorithm 3 with the restriction of k-uniform selector at iteration i, and let zk
i∗(k) denote the least
fixpoint (i.e., i∗(k) is the least value of i such that zki = zki+1). Since k-uniform selectors are a
subset of k + 1-uniform selectors, it follows that the maximal value obtained over strategies that uses
k + 1-uniform selectors is at least the maximal value obtained over k-uniform selectors. Since zk
i∗(k)
denote the maximal value obtained over k-uniform selectors (follows from Lemma 17), we have that
zk
i∗(k) ≤ zk+1i∗(k+1) (note that we do not require that i∗(k) ≤ i∗(k + 1), i.e., the algorithm with k + 1-
uniform selectors may require more iterations to terminate). We have vk = zki∗(k) and hence the first
result follows.
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Figure 3: A simple game with irrational value.
2. The result follows from Theorem 7.
3. From Lemma 18 it follows that for all ε > 0, there exists a k > 0 such that for all s we have
zk
i∗(k)(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε. Hence vk ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε. Hence we have that for
all ε > 0, there exists k ≥ 0, such that for all s ∈ S we have vk(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε.
4. By part (1) for all i ≥ 0 we have vi+1 ≥ vi. By part (3), for all ε > 0, there exists i ≥ 0 such that for
all s ∈ S we have vi(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε. Hence it follows that for all ε > 0, there exists
i ≥ 0 such that for all j ≥ i and for all s ∈ S we have vj(s) ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε. It follows
that limi→∞ vi = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )).
This gives us the following result.
Discussion on convergence of Algorithm 2. We will now present an example to illustrate that (contrary to
the claim of Theorem 4.3 of [2]) Algorithm 2 need not converge to the values in concurrent safety games.
However, as discussed before Algorithm 2 satisfies the monotonicity and optimality on termination, and for
turn-based stochastic games (and also when restricted to k-uniform strategies) converges to the values as
termination is guaranteed. In the example we will also argue how Algorithm 4 converges to the values of
the game.
Example 3 Our example consists of two steps. In the first step we will present a gadget where the value is
irrational and with probability 1 absorbing states are reached.
Step 1. We first consider the game shown in Fig 3 with three states {s0, s1, s2} with two actions a, b for
player 1 and c, d for player 2. The states s0, s1 are safe states, and s2 is a non-safe state. The transitions
are as follows: (1) s1 and s2 are absorbing; and (2) in s0 we have the following transitions, (a) given action
pairs ac and bd the next state is s1, (b) given action pair bc the next state is s2, and (c) given action pair ad
the next states are s0 and s1 with probability 1/2 each. In this game, the state s0 is transient, as given any
action pairs, the set {s1, s2} of absorbing states is reached with probability at least 1/2 in one step. Hence
the set {s1, s2} is reached with probability 1, irrespective of the choice of strategies of the players. Hence
in this game the objective for player 1 is equivalently to reach s1. Let us denote by x the value of the game
at s0, and let us consider the following matrix
M =
[
1 x2
0 1
]
Then x = minmaxM . In other words, consider the valuation vx = (x, 1, 0) for states s0, s1 and s2,
respectively, and x = minmaxM describes that vx = Pre1(vx), and it is the least fixpoint of valuations
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Figure 4: Counter example game.
satisfying v = Pre1(v). We now analyze the value x at s0. The solution of x is achieved by solving the
following optimization problem
minimize x subject to y + ((1− y) · x)/2 ≤ x and 1− y ≤ x.
Intuitively, y denotes the probability to choose move a in an optimal strategy. The solution to the optimiza-
tion problem is achieved by setting x = 1− y. Hence we have y+(1− y)2/2 = (1− y), i.e., (1+ y)2 = 2.
Since y must lie in the interval [0, 1], we have y =
√
2 − 1, and thus we have x = 2 − √2 < 0.6. We
now analyze Algorithm 2 on this example. Let vi denote the valuation of the i-th iteration, and let v0i be the
value at state s0. Then we have v0i < v0i+1 and in the limit it converges to value 2 −
√
2. We observe that
on this example Algorithm 2 exactly behaves as Algorithm 1 (strategy improvement for reachability) as the
objective for player 1 is equivalently to reach s1, since s0 is transient. The reason of the strict inequality
v0i < v
0
i+1 is as follows: if the valuation at state s0 in i-th and i + 1-th iteration is the same, then by cor-
rectness of Algorithm 1 it follows that the values would have been achieved in finitely many steps, implying
convergence to a rational value at s0. The convergence to the values in the limit is due to correctness of
Algorithm 1.
Step 2. We will now augment the game of Step 1 to construct an example to show that Algorithm 2 does not
necessarily converge to the values. Consider the game shown in Fig 4 augmenting the game of Fig 3 with
some additional states (states s3, s4 and s5) and transitions (we only show the interesting transitions in the
figure for simplicity). All the additional states shown are safe states. The value of state s5 is 0.6 (consider it
as a probabilistic state going to state s1 with probability 0.6 and s2 with probability 0.4, and these edges are
not shown in the figure). The transitions at state s3 and s4 are as follows: in state s3, player 1 can goto state
s0 or s4 by choosing actions a and b, respectively (at s3 player 2 has only one action ⊥); and in state s4,
player 2 can goto state s3 or s5 by choosing actions c and d, respectively (at s4 player 1 has only one action
⊥). We analyze Algorithm 2 on the example shown in Fig 4. In this game, at s3 player 1 starts by playing
actions a and b uniformly, and player 2 responds by chosing action c. In the iterations of the algorithm it
follows by the argument of Step 1, that the set I of Step 3.1 of Algorithm 2 is always non-empty as s0 ∈ I .
Hence in every iteration the value at s0 improves, and the strategy in s3 and s4 does not change. Hence the
valuation at s3 converges to the valuation at s0, i.e., to 2−
√
2 < 0.6. However, by switching to action b at
s3, player 1 can enforce player 2 to play action d at s4 and ensure value 0.6. In other words, the value at s3
is 0.6, whereas Algorithm 2 converges to 2−√2 < 0.6.
The switching to action b would have been ensured by the turn-based construction of Step 3.3. For
turn-based stochastic games or k-uniform memoryless strategies, since convergence to values is guaranteed,
the turn-based construction of Step 3.3 is also ensured to get executed. However, as the convergence to
values in concurrent games is in the limit, Step 3.3 of Algorithm 2 may not get executed as shown by
this example. However, we now illustrate that the valuations of Algorithm 4 converges to the values. We
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consider Algorithm 4: Consider k-uniform strategies, for a finite k ≥ 2, then the value at s0 for k-uniform
strategies converges in finitely many steps to a value smaller than 0.6 (as it converges to a value smaller
than the value at s0), and then Step 3.3 of Algorithm 3 would get executed, and the value at s3 would be
assigned to 0.6. In other words, for Algorithm 4 the values at s3, s4 and s5 are always set to 0.6, and the
value at s0 converges in the limit to 2−
√
2. Thus with the example we show that though Algorithm 2 does
not necessarily converge to the values, Algorithm 4 correctly converges to the values.
Retraction of Theorem 4.3 of [2]. In [2], the convergence of Algorithm 2 was claimed. Unfortunately the
theorem is incorrect (with irreparable error) as shown by Example 3 and we retract the claim of Theorem 4.3
of [2] of convergence of Algorithm 2 for concurrent games.
Complexity. Algorithm 2 may not terminate in general; we briefly describe the complexity of every itera-
tion. Given a valuation vi, the computation of Pre1(vi) involves the solution of matrix games with rewards
vi; this can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. Given vi, if Pre1(vi) = vi, the sets
OptSel(vi, s) and OptSelCount(vi, s) can be computed by enumerating the subsets of available actions at s
and then using linear-programming. For example, to check whether (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(vi, s) it suffices
to check both of these facts:
1. (A is the support of an optimal selector ξ1). there is an selector ξ1 such that (i) ξ1 is optimal (i.e. for
all actions b ∈ Γ2(s) we have Preξ1,b(vi)(s) ≥ vi(s)); (ii) for all a ∈ A we have ξ1(a) > 0, and for
all a 6∈ A we have ξ1(a) = 0;
2. (B is the set of counter-optimal actions against ξ1). for all b ∈ B we have Preξ1,b(vi)(s) = vi(s),
and for all b 6∈ B we have Preξ1,b(vi)(s) > vi(s).
All the above checks can be performed by checking feasibility of sets of linear equalities and inequalities.
Hence, TB(G, vi, F ) can be computed in time polynomial in size of G and vi and exponential in the number
of moves. We observe that the construction is exponential only in the number of moves at a state, and
not in the number of states. The number of moves at a state is typically much smaller than the size of the
state space. We also observe that the improvement step 3.3.2 requires the computation of the set of almost-
sure winning states of a turn-based stochastic safety game: this can be done both via linear-time discrete
graph-theoretic algorithms [4], and via symbolic algorithms [10]. Both of these methods are more efficient
than the basic step 3.4 of the improvement algorithm, where the quantitative values of an MDP must be
computed. Thus, the improvement step 3.3 of Algorithm 2 is in practice should not be inefficient, compared
with the standard improvement steps 3.2 and 3.4. We now discuss the above steps for Algorithm 3. The
argument is similar as above, but in case of k-uniform selectors, we need to ensure that the witness selectors
are k-uniform which can be achieved with integer constraints. In other words, for Algorithm 3 the above
checks are performed by checking feasibility of sets of integer linear equalities and inequalities (which can
be achieved in exponential time). Again, the construction is exponential in the number of moves at a state,
and not in the number of states. Hence we enumerate over sets of moves at a state (exponential in number
of moves), and then need to solve integer linear constraints (the size of the integer linear constraints is
polynomial in the number of moves, and is achieved in time exponential in the number of moves). Thus
again the improvement step 3.3 of Algorithm 3 is polynomial in the size of the game, and exponential in the
number of moves.
7.2 Termination for Approximation
In this subsection we present termination criteria for strategy improvement algorithms for concurrent games
for ε-approximation.
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Termination for concurrent games. We apply the reachability strategy improvement algorithm (Algo-
rithm 1) for player 2, for a reachability objective Reach(T ), we obtain a sequence of valuations (ui)i≥0 such
that (a) ui+1 ≥ ui; (b) if ui+1 = ui, then ui = 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )); and (c) limi→∞ ui = 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )).
Given a concurrent game G with F ⊆ S and T = S \ F , we apply Algorithm 1 to obtain the sequence
of valuation (ui)i≥0 as above, and we apply Algorithm 4 to obtain a sequence of valuation (vi)i≥0. The
termination criteria are as follows:
1. if for some i we have ui+1 = ui, then we have ui = 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )), and 1 − ui =
〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )), and we obtain the values of the game;
2. if for some i we have vi+1 = vi, then we have 1−vi = 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )), and vi = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )),
and we obtain the values of the game; and
3. for ε > 0, if for some i ≥ 0, we have ui + vi ≥ 1 − ε, then for all s ∈ S we have vi(s) ≥
〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) − ε and ui(s) ≥ 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T ))(s) − ε (i.e., the algorithm can stop for ε-
approximation).
Observe that since (ui)i≥0 and (vi)i≥0 are both monotonically non-decreasing and 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) +
〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )) = 1, it follows that if ui + vi ≥ 1 − ε, then forall j ≥ i we have ui ≥ uj − ε and
vi ≥ vj − ε. This establishes that ui ≥ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) − ε and vi ≥ 〈〈2〉〉val(Reach(T )) − ε; and the
correctness of the stopping criteria (3) for ε-approximation follows. We also note that instead of applying
the reachability strategy improvement algorithm, a value-iteration algorithm can be applied for reachability
games to obtain a sequence of valuation with properties similar to (ui)i≥0 and the above termination criteria
can be applied.
Theorem 9 Let G be a concurrent game structure with a safety objective Safe(F ). Algorithm 4 and
Algorithm 1 for player 2 for the reachability objective Reach(S \ F ) yield two sequences of monotonic
valuations (vi)i≥0 and (ui)i≥0, respectively, such that (a) for all i ≥ 0, we have vi ≤ 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )) ≤
1− ui; and (b) limi→∞ vi = limi→∞ 1− ui = 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F )).
Bounds for approximation. We now discuss the bounds for approximation for concurrent games with
reachability objectives, which follows from the results of [18, 17]. It follows from the results of [18] that
for all ε > 0, there exist k-uniform memoryless optimal strategies for concurrent reachability and safety
games G, where k is bounded by (1
ε
)2
O(|G|)
. It follows that for all ε > 0, if we consider our strategy
improvement algorithm (restricted to k-uniform selectors) for reachability games, then upon termination
the valuation obtained is an ε-approximation of the value function of the game, where k is bounded by
(1
ε
)2
O(|G|)
. Using the restriction to k-uniform memoryless strategies, along with the reduction of concurrent
games to turn-based stochastic game for k-uniform memoryless strategies and the termination bound for
turn-based stochastic games we obtain a double exponential bound on the number of iterations required for
termination (note that if k = (1
ε
)2
O(|G|)
, then the total number of k-uniform memoryless strategies is kO(|G|),
which is double exponential) (also see [17] for details). Moreover, the recent result of [17] shows that the
double exponential bound is near optimal for the strategy improvment algorithm for concurrent games with
reachability objectives.
Approximation of strategies. The previous method to solve concurrent reachability and safety games was
the value-iteration algorithm. The witness strategy produced by the value-iteration algorithm for concurrent
reachability games is not memoryless; and for concurrent safety games since the value-iteration algorithm
converges from above it does not provide any witness strategies. The only previous algorithm to approximate
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memoryless ε-optimal strategies, for ε > 0, for concurrent reachability and safety games is the naive algo-
rithm that exhaustively searches over the set of all k-uniform memoryless strategies (such that the k-uniform
memoryless strategies suffices for ε-optimality and k-depends in ε). Our strategy improvement algorithms
for concurrent reachability and safety games are the first strategy search based approach to approximate
ε-optimal strategies.
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Algorithm 3 k-Uniform Restricted Safety Strategy-Improvement Algorithm
Input: a concurrent game structure G with safe set F , and number k.
Output: a strategy γ for player 1.
0. Compute W1 = {s ∈ S | 〈〈1〉〉val(Safe(F ))(s) = 1}; and k = max{k, |M |}.
1. Let γ0 = ξunif1 and i = 0.
2. Compute v0 = 〈〈1〉〉γ0val(Safe(F )).
3. do {
3.1. Let Ik = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) | supξ′1∈Λk(s) Pre1:ξ′1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}.
3.2 if Ik 6= ∅, then
3.2.1 Let ξ1 be a k-uniform player-1 selector such that for all states s ∈ I ,
we have Pre1:ξ1(vi)(s) = supξ′1∈Λk(s) Pre1:ξ′1(vi)(s) > vi(s).
3.2.2 The player-1 selector γi+1 is defined as follows: for each state s ∈ S, let
γi+1(s) =
{
γi(s) if s 6∈ Ik;
ξ1(s) if s ∈ Ik.
3.3 else
3.3.1 let(Gkvi , F ) = TB(G, vi, F, k)
3.3.2 let Aki be the set of almost-sure winning states in G
k
vi
for Safe(F ) and
π1 be a pure memoryless almost-sure winning strategy from the set A
k
i .
3.3.3 if ((Aki ∩ S) \W1 6= ∅)
3.3.3.1 let U = (Aki ∩ S) \W1
3.3.3.2 The player-1 selector γi+1 is defined as follows: for s ∈ S, let
γi+1(s) =

γi(s) if s 6∈ U ;
ξ1(s) if s ∈ U, ξ1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s, k),Supp(ξ1(s)) = A,
π1(s) = (s,A,B), B = CountOpt(s, v, ξ1, k).
3.4. Compute vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉γi+1val (Safe(F )).
3.5. Let i = i+ 1.
} until Ik = ∅ and (Aki−1 ∩ S) \W1 = ∅.
4. return γi.
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Algorithm 4 Convergent Safety Strategy-Improvement Algorithm
Input: a concurrent game structure G with safe set F .
Output: a strategy γ for player 1.
0. k = |M | and i = 0.
1. do {
1.1 γi+1 = Algorithm 3(G,F, k)
1.2 Compute vi+1 = 〈〈1〉〉γi+1val (Safe(F ))
1.3 Let I = {s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) | Pre1(vi)(s) > vi(s)}.
1.4 Let(Gvi , F ) = TB(G, vi, F )
1.4.1 let Ai be the set of almost-sure winning states in Gvi for Safe(F ).
1.5 Let i = i+ 1 and k = k + 1.
} until I = ∅ and (Ai−1 ∩ S) \W1 = ∅.
2. return γi.
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8 Technical Appendix
We now present the details of restriction to k-uniform selectors, and the details of the notations used in
Algorithm 3. The definitions are essentially same as for selectors and optimal selectors, but restricted to
k-uniform selectors.
Optimal k-uniform selectors. For k > 0, a valuation v and a state s, let
Prek1(v)(s) = sup
ξ′1∈Λ
k
1 (s)
Pre1:ξ′1(v)(s).
denote the optimal one-step value among k-uniform selectors. For k > 0, given a valuation v and a state s,
we define by
OptSel(v, s, k) = {ξ1 ∈ Λk1(s) | Pre1:ξ1(v)(s) = Prek1(v)(s)}
the set of optimal selectors among k-uniform selectors for v at state s. For a k-uniform optimal selector
ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s, k), we define the set of counter-optimal actions as follows:
CountOpt(v, s, ξ1, k) = {b ∈ Γ2(s) | Preξ1,b(v)(s) = Prek1(v)(s)}.
Observe that for ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s, k), for all b ∈ Γ2(s) \ CountOpt(v, s, ξ1, k) we have Preξ1,b(v)(s) >
Prek1(v)(s). We define the set of k-uniform optimal selector support and the counter-optimal action set as
follows:
OptSelCount(v, s, k) = {(A,B) ⊆ Γ1(s)× Γ2(s) | ∃ξ1 ∈ Λk1(s). ξ1 ∈ OptSel(v, s, k)
∧ Supp(ξ1) = A ∧ CountOpt(v, s, ξ1, k) = B};
i.e., it consists of pairs (A,B) of actions of player 1 and player 2, such that there is a k-uniform optimal
selector ξ1 with support A, and B is the set of counter-optimal actions to ξ1.
Turn-based reduction. Given a concurrent game G = 〈S,M,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉, a valuation v, and bound k for
k-uniformity we construct a turn-based stochastic game Gkv = 〈(S,E), (S1, S2, SR), δ〉 as follows:
1. The set of states is as follows:
S = S ∪ {(s,A,B) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s, k)}
∪ {(s,A, b) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s, k), b ∈ B}.
2. The state space partition is as follows: S1 = S; S2 = {(s,A,B) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈
OptSelCount(v, s, k)}; and SR = {(s,A, b) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s, k), b ∈ B}.
In other words, (S1, S2, SR) is a partition of the state space, where S1 are player 1 states, S2 are
player 2 states, and SR are random or probabilistic states.
3. The set of edges is as follows:
E = {(s, (s,A,B)) | s ∈ S, (A,B) ∈ OptSelCount(v, s, k)}
∪ {((s,A,B), (s,A, b)) | b ∈ B} ∪ {((s,A, b), t) | t ∈
⋃
a∈A
Dest(s, a, b)}.
4. The transition function δ for all states in SR is uniform over its successors.
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Intuitively, the reduction is as follows. Given the valuation v, state s is a player 1 state where player 1 can
select a pair (A,B) (and move to state (s,A,B)) with A ⊆ Γ1(s) and B ⊆ Γ2(s) such that there is a k-
uniform optimal selector ξ1 with support exactly A and the set of counter-optimal actions to ξ1 is the set B.
From a player 2 state (s,A,B), player 2 can choose any action b from the set B, and move to state (s,A, b).
A state (s,A, b) is a probabilistic state where all the states in
⋃
a∈ADest(s, a, b) are chosen uniformly at
random. Given a set F ⊆ S we denote by F = F ∪ {(s,A,B) ∈ S | s ∈ F} ∪ {(s,A, b) ∈ S | s ∈ F}.
We refer to the above reduction as TB, i.e., (Gkv , F ) = TB(G, v, F, k).
Proof. (of Lemma 17). The proof of the result is essentially identical as the proof of Theorem 7, and we
present the details for completeness. Let vi = zki . We show that for all k-uniform memoryless strategies π1
for player 1 we have 〈〈1〉〉π1
val
(Safe(F )) ≤ vi.
Let π2 be a pure memoryless optimal strategy for player 2 in G
k
vi
for the objective complementary
to Safe(F ), where (Gkvi ,Safe(F )) = TB(G, vi, F, k). Consider a k-uniform memoryless strategy π1 for
player 1, and we define a pure memoryless strategy π2 for player 2 as follows.
1. If π1(s) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s, k), then π2(s) = b ∈ Γ2(s), such that Preπ1(s),b(vi)(s) < vi(s); (such a b
exists since π1(s) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s, k)).
2. If π1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s, k), then let A = Supp(π1(s)), and consider B such that B =
CountOpt(vi, s, π1(s), k). Then we have π2(s) = b, such that π2((s,A,B)) = (s,A, b).
Observe that by construction of π2, for all s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ), we have Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s). We
first show that in the Markov chain obtained by fixing π1 and π2 in G, there is no closed connected recurrent
set of states C such that C ⊆ S \ (W1 ∪ T ). Assume towards contradiction that C is a closed connected
recurrent set of states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ). The following case analysis achieves the contradiction.
1. Suppose for every state s ∈ C we have π1(s) ∈ OptSel(vi, s, k). Then consider the strat-
egy π1 in G
k
vi
such that for a state s ∈ C we have π1(s) = (s,A,B), where π1(s) = A,
and B = CountOpt(vi, s, π1(s), k). Since C is closed connected recurrent states, it follows by
construction that for all states s ∈ C in the game Gkvi we have Prπ1,π2s (Safe(C)) = 1, where
C = C ∪ {(s,A,B) | s ∈ C} ∪ {(s,A, b) | s ∈ C}. It follows that for all s ∈ C in Gkvi we
have Prπ1,π2s (Safe(F )) = 1. Since π2 is an optimal strategy, it follows that C ⊆ (Aki ∩S) \W1. This
contradicts that (Aki ∩ S) \W1 = ∅.
2. Otherwise for some state s∗ ∈ C we have π1(s∗) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s∗, k). Let r = min{q |
Uq(vi) ∩ C 6= ∅}, i.e., r is the least value-class with non-empty intersection with C . Hence it
follows that for all q < r, we have Uq(vi) ∩ C = ∅. Observe that since for all s ∈ C we have
Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s), it follows that for all s ∈ Ur(vi) either (a) Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s)) ⊆
Ur(vi); or (b) Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s))∩Uq(vi) 6= ∅, for some q < r. Since Ur(vi) is the least value-class
with non-empty intersection withC , it follows that for all s ∈ Ur(vi)we have Dest(s, π1(s), π2(s)) ⊆
Ur(vi). It follows that C ⊆ Ur(vi). Consider the state s∗ ∈ C such that π1(s∗) 6∈ OptSel(vi, s, k).
By the construction of π2(s), we have Preπ1(s∗),π2(s∗)(vi)(s∗) < vi(s∗). Hence we must have
Dest(s∗, π1(s
∗), π2(s
∗)) ∩ Uq(vi) 6= ∅, for some q < r. Thus we have a contradiction.
It follows from above that there is no closed connected recurrent set of states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ), and hence
with probability 1 the game reaches W1 ∪ T from all states in S \ (W1 ∪ T ). Hence the probability to
satisfy Safe(F ) is equal to the probability to reach W1. Since for all states s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) we have
39
Preπ1(s),π2(s)(vi)(s) ≤ vi(s), it follows that given the strategies π1 and π2, the valuation vi satisfies all the
inequalities for linear program to reach W1. It follows that the probability to reach W1 from s is atmost
vi(s). It follows that for all s ∈ S \ (W1 ∪ T ) we have 〈〈1〉〉π1val(Safe(F ))(s) ≤ vi(s). This completes the
proof.
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